Page 1


1 Thursday, 14th June 2001

2 (9.55 am)

3 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Clarke, before we get on

4 with our next witness, so that people can make travel

5 and similar arrangements, I can say we have manage to

6 arrange the meeting to which I referred yesterday

7 afternoon to take place on Monday, so that the hearings

8 in the Guildhall here will resume, not on Monday, but

9 at Tuesday at 9.30.

10 MR HUGH LOGUE, sworn

11 Questioned by MR CLARKE

12 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Logue, I say this to all

13 the witnesses: the questions will come from the

14 barristers who sit in front of me. All I would ask you

15 to do at this stage is to try and remember to keep your

16 face reasonably close to that microphone in front of

17 you so that everybody is able to hear what you have to

18 say.

19 MR CLARKE: Mr Logue, do you have with you

20 your statement to this Tribunal, signed by you on

21 11th December last year?

22 A. I have, yes.

23 Q. I believe there are two corrections you would

24 like to make. If we go to paragraph 12.1, KL2.4, you

25 there say:


Page 2


1 "Insom(?) attached refers to the split

2 between the Provisional and the Official IRA. I would

3 say that this was an accurate description. At that

4 time the Provisionals ..."; I understand you would like

5 that to read "the Provisional Republican movement was

6 going a certain way and the Officials remained with

7 NICRA."

8 Then it says:

9 "The Provisionals were in the

10 ascendancy ..."; I think you would like that to

11 read "the Provisional Republican movement was in the

12 ascendancy and the Officials in decline"; is that

13 right?

14 A. Almost, but not quite. At the time the

15 Provisional Republican movement was going a certain way

16 and the Official Republican Movement remained with

17 NICRA. It is only in reference to the previous

18 sentence where it says "the Provisional and the

19 Official IRA", and I wanted to make it clear that this

20 is a further thought. At the time the Provisional

21 Republican movement was going a certain way and the

22 Official Republican movement remained with NICRA,

23 otherwise I am satisfied.

24 Q. The second qualification, if we go to

25 paragraph 18, which may be found at KL2.7, the last


Page 3


1 sentence as written reads:

2 "The Simon Winchester article attached, dated

3 18th April 1972, after the AGM of NICRA is largely an

4 accurate portrayal of the situation."

5 I think you would like to add the words:

6 "But not the headline"?

7 A. "The Simon Winchester article but not the

8 headline", yes.

9 Q. Subject to those two qualifications, are the

10 contents of this statement true to the best of your

11 knowledge and belief?

12 A. By and large, yes, I think so. Yes.

13 Q. We have all had the opportunity of reading

14 it, so I am only going to ask you some supplementary

15 questions in relation to it. You describe in

16 paragraphs 3 and 4 how you became involved with the

17 civil rights movement you were at Queens and were

18 yourself injured in the burn toll lit incident. That

19 was at the end of a march from Belfast to Derry; is

20 that right?

21 A. That is right, yes.

22 Q. You describe how you joined the North Derry

23 Civil Rights Association and, together with Finbar

24 O'Kane, and in 1970 he was the Chairman and you were

25 the Vice Chairman of that association and in 1971 you


Page 4


1 were both elected to the Executive Committee of NICRA;

2 is that right?

3 A. That is right, yes.

4 Q. Did you remain Chairman and Vice Chairman of

5 the North Derry Civil Rights Association in 1971?

6 A. '71 and '72.

7 One other thing there, if I may, in terms of

8 paragraph 3: I only joined the march at Claudy. I had

9 not been in it from Belfast.

10 Q. You describe, in paragraph 5 in relation to

11 the North Derry Civil Rights Association, how neither

12 you nor Finbar O'Kane had any political alignment,

13 although you became a member of the SDLP.

14 You say that:

15 "Our populist inclusive leadership, prevented

16 members of the Official Republicans from gaining

17 authority"; that is in the North Derry Civil Rights

18 Association, is that right?

19 I want to ask you about the position in

20 relation to the national organisation, NICRA. If we

21 come to paragraph 9 at KL2.3, you describe in that

22 paragraph how there was no representation within NICRA

23 of Official party positions, but there were members

24 sympathetic to Official republicanism, communism and

25 non-alliance centre group, which included you,


Page 5


1 Professor Kevin Boyle as he now is and Finbar O'Kane

2 and a small number sympathetic towards the Northern

3 Resistance Movement.

4 You describe how, by the end of 1971 the

5 Official Republican/Communist alliance within NICRA had

6 a small majority, but those of you who were in the

7 centre stayed on because you believe you could resist

8 any takeover and maintain the broadest possible

9 grouping in NICRA; is that right?

10 A. That is what I have said there.

11 Q. I assume it is correct?

12 A. Well, I think I should say that NICRA was an

13 umbrella body.

14 Q. Yes. Could we have on the screen GEN5.23?

15 I wonder if I could very quickly go through with you an

16 exercise that I have performed in relation to another

17 witness to identify the political alignment so far as

18 known of the Executive Committee. This is a NICRA

19 document. It is headed "State of the Executive

20 Committee". Its exact date is unknown, but it is

21 plainly post-internment because it refers to two people

22 as being interned and three people as being not

23 available. We understand that was because they were

24 trying to avoid being interned. It gives the list of

25 the elected representatives, the regional


Page 6


1 representatives and a number of co-options. I am sure

2 there are a lot of names there are familiar to you.

3 If we go through them: Ivan Barr, am I right

4 in thinking that he was in the Official Republican

5 Movement?

6 A. I think so.

7 Q. Frank Gogarty?

8 A. Was not, from what I recall.

9 Q. Was he any party alignment?

10 A. I do not think so.

11 Q. Edwina Stewart, we know was communist.

12 Ann Hope?

13 A. Ann Hope did not have alliances, but she

14 tended to vote similar to Edwina.

15 Q. Kevin Boyle, non-aligned.

16 Rebecca McGlade?

17 A. Had Republican, from what I recall.

18 Q. Andrew Boyd?

19 A. Was Northern Ireland Labour Party, I think.

20 Q. We know George Huxley was a professor at

21 Queens, but I think no particular political alignment?

22 A. Exactly.

23 Q. Aidan Corrigan?

24 A. Would have been sympathetic, I think, to the

25 Northern -- what were they called, Northern Resistance


Page 7


1 Movement.

2 Q. Yes. Des O'Hagan?

3 A. Republican Clubs.

4 Q. Malachy McGurran, Republican Clubs?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Liam McMillen?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. The same, in other words?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Sam Dowling, the same?

11 A. I am not sure.

12 Q. Finbar O'Kane?

13 A. Non-aligned.

14 Q. Hugh Logue is you.

15 Rory McShane?

16 A. Non-aligned.

17 Q. John McClelland?

18 A. Non-aligned.

19 Q. Brigid Bond?

20 A. Would have voted by and large with the

21 Republican Clubs when it came to a vote, which there

22 were not all that many of.

23 Q. Jimmy Doris?

24 A. Non-aligned.

25 Q. Madge Davidson, we know was communist.


Page 8


1 Dalton Kelly?

2 A. I always regarded as being sympathetic to the

3 Republican.

4 Q. Joe Deighan?

5 A. I thought he had sympathies with, along with

6 the Edwina -- the Communist Party line, I could not be

7 sure.

8 Q. That is what Edwina Stewart told us.

9 Miriam Daly?

10 A. I first met her in SDLP circles as far as

11 I recall and would, I think, eventually went much more

12 -- at that stage would have been non-aligned, but was

13 moving towards sympathy for Provisionals, I think.

14 Q. Bried Ruddy?

15 A. Again, non-aligned, but would have taken the

16 whip, shall I say, from the Republican side of things.

17 Q. Go back to paragraphs 6 and 7 of your

18 statement at KL2.2. You describe there on the

19 introduction of internment the North Derry Civil Rights

20 Association organised a series of demonstrations in

21 a number of villages in the North Derry area and two

22 demonstrations to the Magilligan camp which was being

23 prepared.

24 You describe how, on 16th August, you

25 participated with John Hume and Ivan Cooper in


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1 a demonstration in Laburnam Terrace designed to prevent

2 army tanks rolling into the Bogside.

3 You do mean "tanks", do you, as opposed to

4 some other form of army vehicle?

5 A. These military vehicles were the size of

6 houses, so, tanks, I think they were, they were very

7 large -- they were not personnel carriers, the normal

8 kind of personnel carriers, they were tanks, yes.

9 LORD SAVILLE: We have pictures of what we

10 have been calling Pigs, which are pretty formidable

11 looking vehicles.

12 MR CLARKE: You describe how soldiers under

13 the command of Paddy Ashdown, who did well thereafter,

14 used water cannon and fired rubber bullets to disperse

15 the protest. This was the occasion which gave rise to

16 the celebrated Londonderry Justice's case, which you

17 describe in paragraph 8?

18 A. Yes, I mean Paddy Ashdown later acknowledged

19 that our sit down action was the most responsible

20 action that could have been taken on the day.

21 Q. Could we come, please, to paragraph 11 at

22 KL2.4?

23 A. May I, before we move on, going back to

24 paragraph 6 because I think there should be some

25 counterbalancing emphasis. The introduction of


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1 internment, there was an immense anger and outrage in

2 the community and we had to confront it; there was no

3 way that it -- one could be rolled over by it, all the

4 more so in Magilligan where right -- the camps were

5 being set up in our very midst. So the challenge to us

6 was to see that the injustice that we regarded

7 internment as had to be confronted and we were clearly

8 determined, in a non-violent manner, to organise the

9 withdrawal of consent to be governed at that time.

10 So I think we have to see the context of it:

11 there was an immense sense of outrage at the time and

12 that should be borne in mind. Thank you.

13 Q. Could we then, please, come to paragraph 11

14 at KL2.4: you recite there how you have been asked

15 about the influence of the Official Republicans in

16 Derry and you say that, in the North Derry Civil Rights

17 Association they carried no authority and your

18 experience was that they carried no real clout in Derry

19 and that it was the Citizens Action Committee,

20 John Hume, Paddy "Bogside" Doherty, and Gary Cooper who

21 carried the real influence in the local community; is

22 that right?

23 A. That is right, yes.

24 Q. We know from the evidence that has

25 accumulated in this case that by the beginning of 1972


Page 11


1 there had been quite a lot of violence in this city

2 from week to week.

3 Were you aware, in general terms, of the

4 extent of the paramilitary organisations in Derry in

5 late 1971/early 1972, simply the size?

6 A. I do not think I was aware of the size.

7 There was clearly activity and there was -- violent

8 incidents were occurring, but I had no idea of the

9 scale of it.

10 Q. We know in relation to the Provisionals that

11 Martin McGuinness was their adjutant.

12 Did you know who the leaders of the

13 Provisionals were in Derry, apart from him?

14 A. Apart from him, you say, the word was that

15 Martin McGuinness was in charge, or running the show.

16 Q. We have heard that too.

17 A. (Laughing) At the time.

18 Q. Did you know whether -- did you know any --

19 I do not mean know personally -- but did you know who

20 else was in the Provos leadership in late 1971/early

21 1972?

22 A. Not at all. One might have been aware that

23 families were sympathetic to them, but that would have

24 been as far as it would have gone.

25 Q. What about the Officials; did you know who


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1 their leaders were in late 1971/1972?

2 A. No.

3 Q. In paragraph 12 you refer to a set of

4 intelligence summaries which you have been shown and

5 which we have obtained. In paragraph 12.2 you refer to

6 a paragraph in one of those intelligence summaries,

7 number 99, which comments that Kevin Agnew was actively

8 recruiting for the Provos and surmises that Kevin

9 Agnew's involvement in NICRA could mean that NICRA was

10 supporting the Provisionals and that such an

11 interpretation is absolutely incorrect; is that right?

12 A. That is what I have said there.

13 Q. That is right, is it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you know, if it was ever the case, that

16 Kevin Agnew was actively recruiting for the Provisional

17 IRA?

18 A. Can I say that I was astonished, generally,

19 at reading the military -- the summaries, intelligence

20 summaries, how hostile they were, how out of touch they

21 were, how even newspapers like the Irish News are

22 dismissed as Republican press, how people like

23 John Hume and Ivan Cooper are treated as if they are

24 fellow travellers and sympathisers with the Republican

25 movement.


Page 13


1 As regards Trevor Agnew, Agnew participated

2 in platforms; he was on the street each day; he was

3 around. We had the -- you had the power of internment,

4 or the Government had the power of internment at that

5 time. If these Military Intelligence -- if they

6 believed their own Military Intelligence, they had the

7 opportunity to pick him up at any stage to interrogate

8 him. I do not think that ever happened.

9 So I have no faith in it whatsoever. He

10 could be a rather flamboyant speaker and cause perhaps

11 some embarrassment to NICRA and therefore you will find

12 that he was seldom on the North Derry platforms, but

13 there was no reason to believe -- and I still do not

14 believe -- that he was recruiting for the Provisionals

15 and if the army believed for one moment that he was,

16 they had the opportunity to take action on it; he was

17 not hidden or on the run.

18 Q. I think Kevin Agnew had been on the Executive

19 at the beginning of the 1971/72 year, but I think he

20 resigned and his place was taken by Finbar O'Kane, is

21 that right?

22 A. It was prior to my coming on the Executive.

23 Q. If we go to paragraph 12.4, at KL2.5, you say

24 that in general you found the comments contained in the

25 intelligence summaries to be wide of the mark since


Page 14


1 they were attempting to illustrate a link between the

2 civil rights movement and the IRA; no such link, formal

3 or informal, existed.

4 Did you know that Liam McMillen, a member of

5 the NICRA Executive, was a prominent member of the

6 Belfast Official IRA?

7 A. I did not.

8 Q. Can I tell you why I am asking you that:

9 could we have on the screen LTL12? This is a passage

10 from the well-known book "Lost Lives" detailing the

11 deaths of everybody, civilian or Security Forces who

12 lost their lives in the troubles. This is the entry

13 that deals with the death of Billy McMillan on 28th

14 April 1975, and in the last two paragraphs in this

15 column it describes him as having held a key position

16 in Belfast republicanism and having been:

17 "One of the most respected IRA members in

18 west Belfast throughout the 1950s and 1960s as having

19 taken part in the IRA campaign of the 1950s and

20 interned for four years, standing in 1964 as the

21 Sinn Fein candidate for west Belfast."

22 If we could highlight the next column,

23 please: it describes how, during the period of

24 internment, he was described as one of the most wanted

25 men in Northern Ireland. In the next paragraph, it


Page 15


1 describes how, over the period from 1971 to 1975 there

2 were at least three attempts on his life.

3 Did you know any of that, apart from the

4 obvious fact of him standing in the Sinn Fein interest

5 in the elections?

6 A. When you say -- I know it now that you have

7 told it to me, that he was one of the most wanted men.

8 There were quite a number of people who would have been

9 sought after by -- post-internment.

10 Q. May I take you back to the previous stage in

11 terms of -- this is the first time I have seen this,

12 but I note that in the paragraph above you say, it said

13 that McMillan was trying to -- where was it, "negotiate

14 a cease-fire". Can we have the top?

15 A. "His death came as he was apparently

16 attempting to negotiate a cease-fire in a Republican

17 feud."

18 I did not know him very well. At meetings he

19 did not say a lot, but so long as people were signed up

20 to non-violence I was ready to welcome them and,

21 therefore, I would have assumed he was signed up to

22 non-violence when he was on our Executive.

23 Q. You were not aware that attempts had been

24 made on his life in 1971, or at some time after 1971?

25 A. Well, if I was, I have forgotten.


Page 16


1 Q. May we come, please, to paragraphs 13 and 14

2 on KL2.5: you describe in paragraph 13 how one of the

3 groups involved in NICRA was the Northern Resistance

4 Movement whose objective appeared to be to make the

5 aims of NICRA more Catholic orientated and wished to

6 focus on Catholic rights, thereby adopting a sectarian

7 approach to civil rights with which the North Derry

8 Civil Rights Association did not agree."

9 What are Catholic rights?

10 A. They were wanting to concentrate on

11 discrimination against Catholics and that appeared to

12 me, as I say there, to adopt a sectarian approach,

13 whereas on all my time on the NICRA Executive I do not

14 recall anyone advocating a sectarian approach, a

15 sectarian sentiment; there was not a sectarian fibre in

16 the body of NICRA.

17 Might I also say that I never recall anyone

18 proposing any proposal to act violently or anyone

19 supporting violence with references to Mr McMillan or

20 any of the rest of them. I never remember that around

21 the table at NICRA.

22 Q. May we come to KL2.6, paragraph 15: in this

23 paragraph you refer to the use of stewards and NICRA's

24 involvement with stewards. You make the qualification

25 that that was not something that you were ever directly


Page 17


1 involved in organising, but you say that your

2 perception is that:

3 "The NICRA Executive appointed a Chief

4 Steward for the march, plus several assistants, and

5 that it was then the responsibility of the Chief

6 Steward and his helpers to multiply their numbers."

7 How strong is that perception; was that

8 always so? The reason I am asking is we have the

9 impression, at any rate in relation to the Derry march,

10 that the stewarding was dealt with at local level and

11 we have not heard, I think, before of a NICRA Executive

12 appointed chief steward for the march?

13 A. I think that may not be -- that is in danger

14 of misleading you when I say "the NICRA Executive

15 appointed a Chief Steward for the march". They would

16 have sought to ensure a chief steward was appointed.

17 For example in the North Derry march to Magilligan we

18 had appointed Vincent McMahon as our chief steward for

19 the march, together with some of the other stewards

20 I have mentioned there, and they would then have

21 secured other people. That is the basis, Mr Clarke,

22 that I am responding from -- okay.

23 Q. They would have seen to it that there was one

24 without necessarily appointing one themselves?

25 A. They would have satisfied themselves that one


Page 18


1 was there and that they had confidence in him.

2 Q. May we then come, please, to paragraph 17 at

3 KL2.6? This is in the portion of your statement

4 dealing with the civil rights marches and the

5 possibility of IRA involvement. You describe in

6 paragraph 17, in the second sentence, how, if it was

7 the case that NICRA sought any assurances from the

8 Provisional IRA prior to the Derry march, you were not

9 informed of this nor aware of it at the time.

10 Does the same hold good for the Official IRA?

11 A. Absolutely.

12 Q. Were you aware of the Derry Civil Rights

13 Association seeking some sort of assurance or

14 indication from either paramilitary wing?

15 A. Only long after the event.

16 Q. You were not aware at the time.

17 May we then come, please, to paragraph 19 on

18 KL2.7 which deals with the Magilligan march which, as

19 you say, was organised by the North Derry Civil Rights

20 Association, though, as I understand it, under the

21 auspices, as it were, of NICRA; is that right?

22 A. That is right.

23 Q. You were obviously there. We have heard

24 quite a lot of evidence about it and I do not want to

25 go into that in any detail, but could I come to KL2.9?


Page 19


1 You describe at the top of that page, KL2.9,

2 how, as the march approached the barbed wire, hastily

3 erected by the army banning your way along the beach,

4 the soldiers opened up with rubber bullets and came

5 towards you wielding batons.

6 Was that because some of the protesters had

7 tried to get into the fenced-off area by going round

8 the fence where it gave out at the high water mark?

9 A. That might be what the army would say. What

10 happened, I think, was that the wire was hastily placed

11 across the beach down, as you say, to the high water

12 mark, indeed into the water, and some people would have

13 ran towards the sea to get around that point before the

14 barricade prevented them.

15 Q. Were they laying the barbed wire as the march

16 approached?

17 A. They were extending it.

18 Q. Extending it?

19 A. Extending it.

20 Q. May we come, then, to the Derry march itself

21 and may we look, please, at KL2.10?

22 You describe in paragraph 26 how you were not

23 asked to take part in the organisation of the march,

24 save to ask John Hume to participate. I assume you did

25 ask him to do so; is that right?


Page 20


1 A. Yes.

2 Q. What was the upshot?

3 A. Well, you have asked me there a number of

4 questions. I had not participated in the organisation

5 because, on 7th January where it was decided to hold

6 the meeting, I was not at that meeting, in fact I was

7 on my honeymoon, and at the meeting on 14th I was

8 asked. It was probable that I indicated that John Hume

9 might not participate, and I notice from the minutes of

10 the NICRA meeting that a fallback of Ivan Cooper,

11 I think that would have come from me, suggesting that

12 if Hume was not available -- because as far as I can

13 recall from the NICRA minutes there is nowhere else is

14 there a fallback speaker suggested.

15 What was the upshot of asking John Hume?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. I think it was probable I would have asked

18 Hume about Magilligan and Derry at the same time. He

19 would have agreed to Magilligan because he had a great

20 deal of confidence, or he had a considerable amount of

21 confidence, in the North Derry Civil Rights

22 Association, a confidence that did not fully extend to

23 the Derry Civil Rights Association. He agreed to

24 Magilligan.

25 I recall us debating would we set out on the


Page 21


1 road or on the beach. He was very keen to take the

2 paths that would take us off the road and down to the

3 beach because that would be a legal march, and I think

4 at that point I came away with the view that I would

5 bag the Magilligan attendance and wait to see if he

6 would attend later the Derry one, but I already had

7 doubts that he would do Derry.

8 Q. We know that in the event he did not. Do you

9 know why he did not; did he tell you why he was not

10 going to?

11 A. I should say that John Hume was a person for

12 whom I have the highest respect; he is a man of immense

13 moral, physical and political courage; I have not met

14 his like. When he indicated that he had doubts, his

15 primary doubts, I think at that time were about the

16 organisers, not so much, I think, their competence in

17 terms of stewarding or anything like that because there

18 had been a number of marches in Derry which he had

19 participated, some of which had been banned over the

20 time and all had been very well stewarded by the

21 Catholic ex-servicemen, by a range of groupings within

22 the city and I think his doubts rested really with the

23 Civil Rights Association in this city, from which he

24 was alienated.

25 Q. We had a witness yesterday, Mr Havord, who


Page 22


1 was the Press Officer of the Association who told the

2 Tribunal that John Hume had said to him, Mr Havord,

3 that he regarded the Derry CRA as politically

4 dangerous?

5 A. I saw that view -- what was said yesterday

6 and if John Hume said that, John Hume said that.

7 I think that the further interpretation that John Hume

8 was not in any way politically nervous of them in terms

9 of opposition is without foundation. As far as

10 I recall, many of that group that were then

11 pro-Republican Clubs in the city ran in the next

12 election after Bloody Sunday. I would doubt if they

13 saved their deposit. Mr Hume, Mr Canavan and myself

14 were elected.

15 Q. We can tell from your previous answers fairly

16 recently the minutes that have survived of the NICRA

17 Executive on 7th January and 14th January 1972. We

18 have had some evidence that there was a meeting of the

19 NICRA Executive on 28th January, which was the Friday

20 which would be its normal time to meet.

21 Do you remember whether you were present at a

22 meeting, the Friday immediately before the march?

23 A. I should say I have only seen the minutes in

24 recent times, very recent times, when the statements of

25 other participants have, or other witnesses have been


Page 23


1 given to me and I did not have them at the time I was

2 making my own statement or any corrections to my

3 statement.

4 My recollection is that I was there.

5 I cannot be certain that I was there, but I notice that

6 George Huxley says that he chaired a meeting and

7 I recall a meeting that George Huxley chaired. I think

8 I would have been there as well on the basis of giving

9 information about the participants and -- but I do not

10 recall a great deal about the meeting.

11 Q. We know that in the event the march did not

12 attempt to go through the barricades at the east end of

13 William Street, but the lorry turned off, taking a

14 right-hand turn, going down Rossville Street to Free

15 Derry Corner.

16 Do you remember when that was mooted? It may

17 not matter much precisely when it was; do you happen to

18 remember?

19 A. I cannot be sure.

20 Q. We know also that on 14th January meeting

21 there was a delegation from Derry who were reporting

22 back about the march, four or five members of the

23 Executive having been sent to Derry, as it were,

24 following the meeting of 7th January.

25 Do you have any recollection of the delegates


Page 24


1 and the subcommittee, as it were, reporting of the

2 state of the organisation of the march on Derry?

3 A. Can I say a couple of points, if I may

4 there: I noticed in, I think it was Professor Boyle's,

5 that I was a member of that; I was not, and Kevin now

6 accepts that I was not a member of that. I can plead

7 honeymoon again there at that meeting, so I was not a

8 member of that grouping. I do not remember much of the

9 detail in terms of the group that gave -- that attended

10 the 14th January meeting. I suspect that they were

11 brought along and it was often in the nature that they

12 would have come and been pleased to be there but would

13 not have said very much at the meeting, they would have

14 left it to whoever was coming.

15 I do recall now on the 28th meeting, and

16 I think I made reference to it in my statement

17 somewhere, that I would have been advising that the

18 potential threat of the counter demonstration was

19 nothing to take serious and that it was unlikely, and

20 I think there would have been still a degree of

21 resolution in nearly everyone, and certainly in myself

22 and a number of others, that we should go to the

23 Guildhall because the Guildhall would have been out of

24 the ghetto and the Guildhall, as far as I recall, we

25 had had a demonstration directly post-internment, a


Page 25


1 very ad hoc, very quick demonstration, about 14th, 15th

2 August of that year in which Finbar O'Kane participated

3 as well, and it was important to claim the Guildhall

4 for subliminal reasons in terms of the Commission

5 coming into this city and what this building

6 represented.

7 Q. Did you say it was important to claim the

8 Guildhall?

9 A. Claim the Guildhall Square in sofar as it

10 should not be -- I do not mean in any sense of victory

11 or I do not mean exclusively, but I think we should not

12 be denied is what I am saying, the Guildhall.

13 Q. Were you proposing to come into the

14 Guildhall?

15 A. No, sorry, I am using shorthand for the

16 Guildhall Square.

17 Q. I wanted to make clear what you said.

18 May we come to the day itself and could I ask

19 you to look at paragraph 32, which is at KL2.11? You

20 describe the march proceeding down William Street,

21 seeing barbed wire and barricades, thinking that all

22 the surrounding streets were barricaded so there was

23 only one way forward and having the impression that

24 most people would have known to turn right no

25 Rossville Street.


Page 26


1 May I ask you this: when you started on the

2 march, where did you think the march was going to end

3 up?

4 A. It is a good question. (Pause) I suppose

5 there still was the hope that it would get to the

6 Guildhall.

7 Q. But you saw, presumably, the -- by the time

8 you had got to the junction the lorry and the march had

9 already turned down, had they?

10 A. That is right.

11 Q. When you say, therefore, that you had the

12 impression that most people would have known to turn

13 right into Rossville Street, do you mean by that that

14 you reckoned that when the lorry turned, as in the

15 event it did, most people would go with it?

16 A. I mean, reflecting on your previous question:

17 I had no great sense of disappointment or frustration

18 that our way was blocked. Clearly, I would have

19 preferred the Guildhall, and I think we fully expected

20 people to follow the lorry.

21 There was, from what I remember, a row of

22 stewards across the, at William Street, particularly

23 covering the pavements. There was also a barricade,

24 was there not, of some sort?

25 Q. It depends where you mean by


Page 27


1 "William Street"; there was an army barricade at the

2 end of William Street as it turns to go towards the

3 Guildhall Square.

4 A. At the junction of William Street stewards

5 were encouraging people to go down.

6 Q. At the junction of William Street and where?

7 A. Rossville Street.

8 Q. There was not a barricade there?

9 A. No, but there was a group of stewards there.

10 Across and behind them there would have been -- further

11 back down William Street there was a barricade.

12 Q. At the time you got there, you saw stewards

13 at the junction, but behind them, as I understand it,

14 and further east down William Street, rioting was

15 already going on at the army barricade?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Had the NICRA Executive considered the

18 possibility or likelihood of there being rioting at a

19 barricade if it was placed at the end of

20 William Street?

21 A. They never for one moment contemplated that

22 there would be gunfire, it would have been crazy and it

23 never crossed their mind, despite Magilligan, that

24 gunfire would open, otherwise people would not have

25 been brought onto the streets.


Page 28


1 As for rioting, I do not think they

2 contemplated that either. There had been, on the other

3 hand, at previous demonstrations what the army referred

4 to as "aggro" after marches, at the fringes of it and,

5 I suppose, to use an army phrase "there was an

6 acceptable level of aggro" basically that might have

7 been tolerated, but it was not encouraged, in fact it

8 had been wholly deplored by the Civil Rights

9 Association.

10 Q. Did the Civil Rights Association consider any

11 ways or means by which aggravation, "aggro", could be

12 avoided?

13 A. Other than trying to prevent it through

14 stewards, no.

15 Q. Did it have any plan as to how exactly it

16 would prevent it through stewards?

17 A. I think you encouraged the young people to

18 move in the direction of the march and to stay with the

19 march and to desist from taking on the soldiers, that

20 it was counterproductive and that was the only means we

21 had; we only had non-violent means.

22 Q. Some of the witnesses who have given evidence

23 from the NICRA Executive have suggested that the plan

24 was that the lorry would turn right down

25 Rossville Street -- this is if there was a barricade in


Page 29


1 William Street, as in the event there was -- the plan

2 was that the lorry would turn right down William Street

3 and access to the east end of William Street would be

4 prevented by a row of stewards and two people from

5 NICRA would go to the end of William Street, and them

6 alone, to make a protest at the barricade.

7 Do you remember any discussion of some such

8 plan?

9 A. I do not recall the detail -- sorry, I do not

10 recall the detail of it, but it would have had a

11 precedent in terms of earlier marches which John Hume

12 had led in Derry on the bridge, where a token breach of

13 the barricade took place where two people would walk

14 forward and climb across the barrier and make their

15 protest and that satisfied everyone; that had been

16 negotiated in the past.

17 So it does not surprise me that that was, but

18 I do not recall it.

19 Q. You do not recall it. Your answer may be the

20 same to this question in the light of what you have

21 said, but do you recall anybody in the NICRA Executive

22 giving any consideration to the number of stewards that

23 might be needed at what could be a critical point,

24 namely the junction between Rossville Street and

25 William Street if people were to be prevented from


Page 30


1 going down to the east end of William Street and

2 reaching the barricade?

3 A. I think you are assuming a level of

4 discussion at the NICRA Executive about the innards of

5 a march which never really took place, it would have

6 been done at the local organisation level and that

7 would have been between the organiser and the Derry

8 CRA, and certainly in our experience in relation to

9 Magilligan our assurances would have been fully

10 accepted and there would have been no particular

11 investigation into how or why.

12 Q. Do I express it fairly by saying it this way:

13 NICRA regarded that sort of matter as the

14 responsibility of the local Civil Rights Association?

15 A. In conjunction with their chief organiser,

16 McCorry, I would have thought. His word would have

17 carried the day.

18 Q. You describe in paragraph 33 stopping at the

19 junction of William Street and Rossville Street.

20 Could we go down to paragraph 35 on the next

21 page: looking around for Finbar O'Kane, hearing rioting

22 and tear gas being fired at the east end of

23 William Street and being approached by three man and a

24 woman to ask if you could help somebody who had been

25 hit in the face by a gas cannister and then helping him


Page 31


1 down to the flats, or they helped him down to the flats

2 at your suggestion, and you walked in front of the

3 group that was holding him; is that right?

4 A. That is right, yes.

5 Q. I wonder if I could show you a photograph;

6 could we have on the screen P783? Did you cover the

7 name of the injured man, no?

8 A. No, I still do not know his name.

9 Q. Does that photograph bring back any memories?

10 A. I cannot be sure, the hair is accurate.

11 I thought there was -- did I say two men and a woman or

12 a woman and a man.

13 Q. You said three men and a woman. You said you

14 were approached by three men and a woman; your

15 statement does not specifically say how many took him

16 down?

17 A. In that photograph I cannot see his face, can

18 you?

19 Q. No, his face is, I am afraid, hidden by his

20 hair. There is another one, P784; I do not know

21 whether that is any better. No, that is worse. You

22 cannot positively identify?

23 A. No.

24 Q. May we come to paragraphs 35 and 36, KL2.12.

25 You describe -- it is the very end of paragraph 34, we


Page 32


1 need not turn it up -- how, as you got to block 1 of

2 the flats, the group who were with the injured man

3 began to run and overtook you, having seen what was

4 coming behind them and you all ran to the stairwell and

5 as you reached the bottom of the stairwell at the north

6 of block 1, about three APCs drove at speed into the

7 car park and people started to shout and scream.

8 Before then had you been conscious that the

9 army were coming into the Bogside?

10 A. No, before then my only awareness of the army

11 was the army on -- the aggro that was going on on

12 William Street, the gas and that, but I was not aware,

13 no.

14 Q. You describe going up the steps, somebody

15 shouting that "they are shooting" and when you got two

16 or three steps further, turning round and looking

17 through the slats in the stairwell and seeing the three

18 APCs in the car park, the third of which came to a halt

19 at about the point you have marked "B" on your map

20 attached to your statement which is at the mouth of the

21 car park. We can see it there.

22 I would like to show you a photograph, P188,

23 please: this is a photograph taken on the day a bit

24 later in time than the events that you are immediately

25 describing. Is that the sort of view that you saw from


Page 33


1 the slats of the --

2 A. Where am I? That is the stairwell, is it?

3 Q. The stairwell of the flats is there, you can

4 see the slats. There looks to be an armoured personnel

5 carrier in almost exactly the position that you are

6 talking about?

7 A. Well, there were three of them.

8 Q. That is what I wanted to ask you about

9 because we know, from this photograph and others, that

10 the initial location of the army vehicles when they

11 came into the Bogside was that one of them came here,

12 that is to say to the mouth of the car park; one of

13 them went up over on the right-hand side, it is not in

14 the photograph, but went up to have its front facing

15 the back of one of the Chamberlain Street houses; but

16 the rest of them, at an early stage -- and it looks as

17 if we are talking about an early stage -- were in line,

18 almost in line abreast along Rossville Street. There

19 is a soft-skinned lorry there.

20 You have a recollection of seeing three at

21 the mouth of the car park, do you?

22 A. The three I saw, they swept in and you see

23 where you have the two red arrows, they were there,

24 sweeping in there. One of them may have come round

25 there, I think, and two -- but the three were sweeping


Page 34


1 in, initially, in that form and soldiers were

2 disembarking from them before the vehicles became

3 stationary.

4 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, could I ask a

5 question, please? Mr Logue, to your right: when you

6 say "swept in", did any of the three Saracens actually

7 enter that car park area that you can see on the

8 photograph as opposed to being at the mouth of the

9 entrance?

10 A. What I saw, sir, was -- I did not see any

11 coming into that car park, other than where that one

12 there would be. They would have stopped and the other

13 two, I think, would have been behind that.

14 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, are you going to show

15 Mr Logue that photograph with the Saracen at the back

16 of Chamberlain Street?

17 MR CLARKE: I will, I am going to show him

18 another one initially.

19 LORD SAVILLE: Before you do, I wanted to ask

20 a similar question because your written statement says

21 "I saw the three aforementioned APCs stopping in the

22 car park", and I was wondering whether you used the

23 expression "car park" to include this marked-out area

24 we see in this photograph and also at least some of the

25 wasteground behind. I was not quite sure what you


Page 35


1 meant by "stopping in the car park"?

2 A. Are there slats both sides there; I am

3 looking at them through the slats?

4 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, I think there are, are

5 there not; there are slats to the north as well as to

6 the east?

7 MR CLARKE: Yes.

8 LORD SAVILLE: Yes, is the answer?

9 A. I am looking through the slats and I had

10 always assumed that they were out on the corner as it

11 were rather than, and that is car park as well.

12 MR CLARKE: Could we have EP28.4A: this is a

13 photograph taken on the day. You can see that a lot of

14 people are fleeing to the south, to the middle block --

15 towards the middle block or towards the alleyways

16 between the block of flats.

17 Firstly, when you went to the stairwell,

18 which to orientate you is there, were there

19 approximately this number of people or more or less?

20 A. A good deal less.

21 Q. Less?

22 A. And that is Rossville Street behind where you

23 are.

24 Q. That is Rossville Street behind. We can see

25 in this photograph that one of the APCs came across


Page 36


1 there, where I am pointing out, and I believe -- though

2 the photographs may be open to interpretation -- that

3 that is the Pig which ended up off the picture, up

4 facing towards Chamberlain Street.

5 If one looks at EP28.5, which is the next

6 photograph in the sequence; some more vehicles are

7 coming down Rossville Street, we can see them there,

8 and it may be that the vehicle that ended up at the

9 mouth of the car park is actually at this very moment

10 coming out of the top of the block 1 of the flats.

11 What appears then to have happened is that

12 one vehicle ended up in the photograph that I showed

13 you a moment ago at the mouth of the car park,

14 approximately where the red arrow on the screen is and

15 the other vehicle which went to the back of

16 Chamberlain Street, if we could have a look at

17 photograph P594, ended up, as we can see it in this

18 photograph, facing a building at the back of

19 Chamberlain Street just below Eden Place, which is

20 there.

21 Does that bring back any recollection; do you

22 remember seeing a vehicle drive towards the back of

23 Chamberlain Street quite some way away from the car

24 park?

25 A. If you can go back about two photographs,


Page 37


1 I would like, if I can -- if you could go back two

2 photographs --

3 Q. EP28.4A, please.

4 A. -- I think I can answer your question,

5 Mr Clarke, and also deal with the question that was

6 raised by the Chairman. You see where this Pig is,

7 that is what I regarded, and in my statement when I say

8 "the car park", that is the space into which I saw the

9 three arrive. It was the third one from which the

10 soldiers were disembarking. Now it obviously became

11 stationary. I cannot say if the first or the second

12 stopped there, or whether, as you are inquiring,

13 whether they moved further along: three came in, the

14 soldiers were disembarking from the third one and it

15 was by and large located -- and it was out of those

16 slats that I would have been looking in that direction.

17 Q. You saw three coming into the area where

18 approximately your blue arrow is. One of them stopped

19 at the mouth; what happened to the other two you are

20 less sure of; is that right?

21 A. As I say, they moved forward. Perhaps my

22 statement, when I say "the car park", is misleading

23 insofar as that I am not talking about this territory,

24 I am talking about the territory -- is that immediately

25 northwest, or?


Page 38


1 Q. Do not worry about the direction?

2 LORD SAVILLE: It is more or less north in

3 fact.

4 MR CLARKE: You say "the other two moved

5 forward"?

6 A. This was a third one, this is a momentary

7 glance through the slats and the three are sweeping

8 in -- I should say the three were sweeping in over my

9 shoulder off Rossville Street, coming in, if I have --

10 coming in like so, in a circle and the three seemed to

11 be stopping, but the one I saw, the soldier, disembark

12 from was a third one, the latter one.

13 Q. Did the three appear to you to stop fairly

14 close to each other?

15 A. They appeared to, within a matter of metres

16 of each other.

17 Q. May we then come, please, to KL2.13,

18 paragraphs 37 to 39? You describe there proceeding

19 south along the balcony of block 1, trying to enter the

20 first door, opening it and as you did so, hearing a

21 single shot which made a very sharp sound and appeared

22 to come from behind you to the north.

23 Is that the first shot that you heard that

24 day?

25 A. That is the first shot I heard. I am not


Page 39


1 saying it was the first shot because, as I am coming up

2 the stairs, someone said "there is shooting".

3 Q. When somebody said that they were shooting,

4 did you have a recollection of hearing any noise at

5 all?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Had you heard the sound of rubber bullets

8 before you heard the single shot which you describe in

9 this paragraph?

10 A. Certainly at the corner of Rossville Street,

11 and I could not be sure whether it was rubber bullets

12 or gas cannisters, but there was certainly that duller

13 thud, yeah.

14 Q. When you were in Rossville Street coming down

15 to block 1 with the injured man, were you conscious of

16 hearing any rubber bullets in the wasteground or

17 anywhere like that?

18 A. I cannot recall distinguishing rubber bullets

19 from the general melee that there was.

20 Q. Would I be right to assume there was really

21 quite a lot of noise going on?

22 A. That is a correct presumption, yes.

23 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Logue, the Chairman again,

24 you may not be able to answer this: do you have any

25 idea which balcony you got onto?


Page 40


1 A. I got onto the first balcony, I am pretty

2 sure I was on the first balcony. I am not sure,

3 Chairman -- I say there I tried to enter the first

4 door, it may have been the second; the first one that

5 opened, I think.

6 LORD SAVILLE: You think it was probably the

7 first balcony?

8 A. I think it was the first balcony, yes.

9 MR CLARKE: You describe in the succeeding

10 paragraphs how, once you had got into the flat you lay

11 on the floor with a sense of relief, more people dived

12 in, spread themselves around the room on their hands

13 and knees and you heard shots to the front, that is to

14 say to the side of the flat which overlooked

15 Rossville Street and there was then a lull and you

16 looked out of the window and saw a soldier lying flat

17 on the ground with his rifle slightly elevated,

18 pointing south towards Free Derry Corner at the spot

19 that you have marked as "C".

20 May we look at KL2.28. Sorry KL2. --

21 LORD SAVILLE: It is KL2.38 in our bundles.

22 MR CLARKE: Somebody has helpfully numbered

23 mine 28. The spot you have marked as "C" is just to

24 the side of the pram ramp at the north end of

25 Glenfada Park North; is that right?


Page 41


1 A. I cannot be sure of where the pram ramps were

2 and "C" may have been a metre either way. What I do

3 recall was that there was something like a ridge wall.

4 The soldier was lower than a ridge wall, I think, that

5 was alongside there.

6 Q. Did you see any other soldier at that stage?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Or any army vehicles?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You describe in paragraph 39, KL2.13 --

11 A. If I may, you asked me there a moment ago did

12 I see any other soldiers or anyone; I am not saying

13 there was not any out in front, but my height above, my

14 eye is just above the windowsill, I would not have been

15 able to see directly below me onto the flats and ...

16 Q. You describe in paragraph 40 how the soldier

17 did not appear to feel himself under any threat or to

18 take cover.

19 If we go to paragraph 41 on the next page you

20 describe hearing a single shot and lowering your head

21 and the shot appeared to come from his direction; is

22 that right?

23 A. That is what I said, yes.

24 Q. Should we understand from that that there

25 appeared to be a shot fired towards the block in which


Page 42


1 you were, or simply you heard the noise of a shot and

2 the noise appeared to come from where the soldier was

3 whom you had seen?

4 A. My impression would have been that the shot

5 was towards the Free Derry Corner. I do not know why

6 that was my impression, but I had no sense that they

7 were firing at me or us.

8 Q. If we could take paragraphs 43 to 46: you

9 describe remaining on the floor until Father Irwin came

10 and then subsequently, see paragraph 5 walking down the

11 stairs with Father Irwin and seeing a body near the

12 bottom of the stairwell, which you think was Kevin

13 McElhinney.

14 Did you know Kevin McElhinney?

15 A. No.

16 Q. So why do you think it was him?

17 A. I learned afterwards that it was. I learned

18 afterwards that that was probably who it was of the 13.

19 Q. You went out of the flats and saw the body of

20 Barney McGuigan and you helped to carry

21 Barney McGuigan, and the man you believe is Kevin

22 McElhinney, to the ambulance and got into the passenger

23 side; is that right?

24 A. I moved round to the passenger side to --

25 because there was a breach in the divide of the


Page 43


1 ambulance, from what I remember, where you would have

2 communicated and I was still involved in organising or

3 trying to accommodate bodies in the ambulance.

4 Q. If we go to paragraph 48, you describe there

5 how, after you had gone to the passenger side of the

6 van to assist from there, the shooting started again

7 and you think that one shot came from the Free Derry

8 Corner and one from the city or William Street side.

9 You describe the sounds of those shots as varied, one

10 made a duller sound and the other made a sharper

11 sound.

12 Can you remember from which side the duller

13 side appeared to come?

14 A. I cannot be sure.

15 Q. Do you have any idea?

16 A. Um, I suspect that the duller sound came from

17 my left-hand side, which would have been the Free Derry

18 Corner.

19 Q. If we look at EP2.19, and if we look at the

20 man in the ambulance -- can we highlight that on the

21 left-hand side, please -- I understand you think that

22 that may be you?

23 A. I think it is.

24 Q. Had the shooting taken place, do you think,

25 before this photograph was taken?


Page 44


1 A. I think definitely not because when the

2 shooting started to take place, I get on my knees on

3 the edge of the van, get my head under a seat and the

4 ambulance moves off while I am in that position while

5 the shooting is going on.

6 Q. If we could restore the whole of this

7 photograph. This photograph and a number of others

8 show the late Father Mulvey?

9 A. Indeed.

10 Q. He is in fact waving a handkerchief and there

11 is a series of photographs in which he walks further

12 north, that is to say further towards William Street.

13 It looks as if what he was doing, there is some

14 evidence he was, trying to stop people shooting because

15 there was an ambulance which needed to take people to

16 hospital. You would not have seen that, I assume

17 because, as we can see if that is you, you are sitting

18 in the ambulance facing Free Derry Corner.

19 Were you conscious of Father Mulvey being

20 there?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Thank you very much, those are my questions.

23 Questioned by SIR LOUIS BLOM-COOPER

24 SIR LOUIS BLOM-COOPER: Mr Logue, just a few

25 questions. Could I first deal with your credentials:


Page 45


1 for the last 15 years or so you have been working at

2 European Commission in Brussels, is that right?

3 A. 1984 to 1989 -- sorry, 1984 to 1999, yes.

4 Q. Variously acting as advisor to Presidents of

5 the Commission?

6 A. When it came to the peace package, I was an

7 advisor to both President Delors and then subsequently

8 for the next passage to President Santerre in the

9 construction of the peace and reconciliation packages

10 which you were provided.

11 Q. Being back to the early 1970s, you were

12 involved with the SDLP; is that right?

13 A. I was not when I joined the civil rights

14 movement and, even when I joined the Northern Ireland

15 Civil Rights Executive, that I became more and more

16 involved -- yes, I was a member of the first Executive,

17 which, I think, was by 1972.

18 Q. In 1973 did you stand and be elected to the

19 National Assembly on behalf of the SDLP?

20 A. I was, yeah.

21 Q. In 1974 did you stand as a Parliamentary

22 candidate for Westminster in the United Kingdom general

23 election?

24 A. For the SDLP.

25 Q. As an SDLP candidate?


Page 46


1 A. I did, yeah.

2 Q. I assume from that period you had close

3 association with John Hume?

4 A. John Hume was the first person to mention to

5 me that I might seek a nomination for the SDLP.

6 Q. It was, presumably as a result of that period

7 of time, in the early 1970s, that you acquired the

8 great admiration for him which you expressed earlier?

9 A. Respect, I think, for him and over the years,

10 yeah.

11 Q. Can I now ask you to look at GEN5.29? This

12 is the second of the two January meetings which were

13 held by the Executive Committee at which you attended.

14 That is the one for 14th January?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You see your name there?

17 A. Yes, indeed.

18 Q. Would you then turn to page 30 and you will

19 see there a discussion, the first item on the agenda;

20 that is 29. Over on page 30 there was a discussion

21 about the disruption day; that would have been 9th

22 February, would it not?

23 A. Uh-huh.

24 Q. And there were arrangements there for some

25 demonstration to take place and you were responsible,


Page 47


1 I think it looks as if you are responsible for

2 arranging matters in Tyrone; is that right?

3 A. My primary responsibility is, I think, a

4 little lower where -- Derry county as well, yes.

5 Q. Would you turn over the page to 31: you will

6 see there a decision by the Executive Committee not to

7 meet with the Northern Resistance Committee again.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Am I right in assuming that you were one of

10 the six?

11 A. I suspect I was, insofar as I had agreed to

12 meet them once, and had met them once and had been

13 disillusioned by the direction that they were going.

14 Q. Would I be right in inferring from that, as a

15 demonstration of NICRA's determination to maintain its

16 independence and not to be associated with any

17 organisation, which did not in fact promote peaceful

18 non-violence?

19 A. If I may take a moment on that --

20 LORD SAVILLE: Before you do, Mr Logue,

21 I would certainly like you to give a little bit of

22 explanation as to what direction you thought at the

23 time they were going?

24 A. Well, Chairman, the prospect of dealing with

25 them, the Northern Resistance Committee or Movement --


Page 48


1 I think, NCM -- any attraction that it had essentially

2 was a geographic attraction because they were much

3 better based in South Tyrone, the Dungannon area; they

4 were much better based in Fermanagh. The

5 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was very

6 poorly organised in those areas and had some difficulty

7 mobilising, so from a geographic reason there would

8 have been an interest in spreading our effectiveness

9 had we been able to reach an accommodation.

10 My sense of them -- that is where I wanted to

11 pick up on what Sir Louis Blom-Cooper was saying --

12 I never had any sense of them being pro-violent, but

13 I had a sense of them being ex-sectarian. Coming back

14 to the issue of concentration on rights exclusively for

15 Catholics and discrimination against Catholics and, as

16 I said earlier, I do not have a sectarian bone in my

17 body and I do not believe I ever encountered, outside

18 of NRC, any sectarianism within the Civil Rights

19 Association.

20 That was where the alienation or the

21 disaffiliation would have been at its most -- at its

22 sharpest.

23 Q. Would I be right in assuming that that

24 demonstrated that NICRA was constantly on the lookout

25 for any association with other organisations in the


Page 49


1 field, in the general field of civil rights?

2 A. We were constantly on the lookout --

3 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure I understood the

4 question.

5 SIR LOUIS BLOM-COOPER: I will rephrase it:

6 that NICRA was always concerned that any association

7 with any other body outside its own organisation should

8 be in conformity with the precepts of the civil rights

9 movement?

10 A. Yes, NICRA was an umbrella body, rather loose

11 umbrella body, but it was an inclusive body that

12 embraced anyone who was prepared to sign up to a

13 culture of non-violence and a means of protesting,

14 vigorous protesting, I have to say, but so long as it

15 was non-violent.

16 Q. Would you turn to KL2.10, paragraph 27? You

17 will see there that you assumed that the NICRA

18 Executive would have formally told the police of the

19 arrangements for the march. Where did you get that

20 assumption from?

21 A. We would have done so for the Magilligan

22 one. I think the Chief Inspector in the area at that

23 time may have been a policeman called Irwin and we

24 would have given him notice that we were doing it, and

25 I think it was a matter of course that you told the


Page 50


1 police that you were going to march, or that you were

2 applying to march. They clearly were not going to give

3 you permission, but -- it was a formal thing rather

4 than anything else of telling them.

5 For example as regards Magilligan, I do not

6 think we gave the exact route to them at any stage, but

7 we would have informed them that we were going to.

8 Q. We have heard that from time to time

9 Brigid Bond had certainly informal talks with

10 Chief Inspector Lagan; did you know about those?

11 A. No, but it would not surprise me.

12 Frank Lagan was an outstanding policeman, working in

13 very difficult circumstances, who kept his ear to the

14 ground and had good relations with a wide range of

15 people as a matter of knowing what was going on.

16 I came to respect him a great deal.

17 Q. Did you yourself know Chief Inspector Lagan?

18 A. Very well.

19 Q. Did you have discussions with him from time

20 to time on policing matters?

21 A. More particularly after I became elected, say

22 1973. At that stage he was more in the city and I was

23 in the county and -- but I would regularly have had

24 discussions with him.

25 Q. How did you regard him?


Page 51


1 A. Very highly.

2 Q. Thank you very much.

3 Questioned by MR LAWSON

4 MR LAWSON: Mr Logue, my name is Lawson and

5 I represent some of the soldiers.

6 Can I ask about a couple of matters, please,

7 concerning your evidence in relation to Bloody Sunday

8 itself before asking for your help on some slightly

9 more general issues. If we have on the screen, so that

10 you can see where my question comes from, KL2.11,

11 paragraph 29?

12 You indicated in your statement, which

13 I assume you adopt, that there was no sense of

14 foreboding about the march and that, for your part at

15 least, you did not know that the Paratroop Regiment

16 would be in Derry?

17 A. That is right, yes.

18 Q. It had not been suggested to you, I take it

19 in terms that the paras were going to be there?

20 A. No.

21 Q. I am not being pedantic, but you say "I did

22 not know they were going to be there"; it had not been,

23 so far as you were aware, rumoured that they were going

24 to be there?

25 A. I had not heard it.


Page 52


1 Q. It is just the Tribunal has heard from some

2 others that there was talk of the paras being there.

3 That, if it happened, did not reach your ears at least?

4 A. I think what I say is, in the context of the

5 previous week at Magilligan, there was the Green

6 Jackets, I think they were called, and the paras, and

7 the paras were an entirely different, of an entirely

8 different nature to the Green Jackets on that day and

9 I think had I realised that the paras were coming from

10 Magilligan to Derry, I would have been much more

11 apprehensive.

12 Q. The only other matter I want to ask you

13 about, is this: in relation to what you saw and heard

14 of shooting on Bloody Sunday -- I will not go over all

15 the ground that has been covered already, or I hope any

16 of it in repetition -- you were aware of APCs, of

17 Armoured Personnel Carriers stopping somewhere near the

18 end of block 1 of the flats, let us not worry about

19 precisely where, and soldiers jumping out?

20 A. That is right.

21 Q. At that stage there was no firing?

22 A. I had not heard any shooting at that point,

23 but it is a matter of instantaneous -- a matter of

24 instance, minute seconds until that first shot I hear

25 and, as I say, someone already had said there was


Page 53


1 shooting, but I had not heard.

2 Q. But you were a matter of feet away, a few

3 feet away, from where the APCs pulled up?

4 A. Yards.

5 Q. All right, yards, but you were not far away?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And you were certainly not aware of any

8 substantial immediate firing?

9 A. I was aware that the soldiers were

10 disembarking from the vehicle and they were

11 disembarking in a manner which permitted them to use

12 their guns very promptly.

13 Q. Yes. Is my question a very difficult one for

14 you?

15 A. Can you repeat it?

16 Q. You, being a matter of yards away, you were

17 not aware of any substantial immediate firing; that is

18 true, is it not?

19 A. By whom?

20 Q. By the soldiers?

21 A. By those soldiers?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. The soldiers that was disembarking from --

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. That is right.


Page 54


1 Q. That is right.

2 MR TOOHEY: Mr Lawson, can you clarify one

3 matter: you put to Mr Logue a question in form that

4 suggested he had said that soldiers had disembarked

5 from the Saracens plural. I took his evidence to be

6 that they had disembarked, so far as he could see, from

7 one of the Saracens; could we clarify that.

8 MR LAWSON: Certainly, sir. Was it one

9 Saracen or more than one Saracen? It is right to say

10 in your statement to the Inquiry at the foot of page

11 KL2.12, you refer to soldiers jumping out of the

12 Saracen in the singular, but you also refer to more

13 than one Saracen stopping.

14 Can you help Mr Toohey in relation to that?

15 A. I think, again, it is the third Saracen

16 arriving in that I thought the soldiers were

17 disembarking from and the member of the Tribunal's

18 recollection, I think, is correct in this.

19 Q. It is one Saracen, as you recall?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That stopped very close to where you were,

22 looking through the slats?

23 A. Yes, there was three Saracens and it was the

24 third of them.

25 Q. As you have said in your statement, and


Page 55


1 doubtless will confirm, the first shot of which you

2 were aware occurred after you had entered into the

3 flat, whether it be the first or second along the first

4 floor balcony?

5 A. Can I say that -- can I see what I said

6 because I thought I said the first shot on the

7 balcony?

8 LORD SAVILLE: Paragraph 37, the next

9 paragraph on the next page.

10 MR LAWSON: Top of page 13, if you want to

11 look at that:

12 "As I proceeded south along the balcony

13 [which you told the Chairman was the first

14 balcony] I tried to enter the first door. I opened it

15 and as I entered the flat I heard a single shot."

16 A. That single shot may well have been, as

17 I say, "as I entered the flat"; it may have been a

18 split second in advance of that.

19 Q. That is the first shot you were aware, at

20 least, whatever others may have been saying about other

21 shooting?

22 A. That is right.

23 Q. That is right. Without trying to put a

24 precise time upon it, is it also right, then, that a

25 short time later there was further shooting that you


Page 56


1 heard?

2 A. That is right.

3 Q. Not many shots, as you recall?

4 A. If that is what I recall, sorry, where is

5 it?

6 Q. I am sorry?

7 A. I am looking for what I recall here.

8 LORD SAVILLE: Can we have the next paragraph

9 up, then?

10 MR LAWSON: You certainly can, paragraph 38,

11 where you say in the anti-penultimate line:

12 "It did not seem to be many"?

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Is that your current recollection?

15 A. That is my recollection.

16 Q. It is. It was after those relatively few

17 shots, then, that you looked out of the window.

18 I want your assistance with this: you have

19 described seeing a soldier in a prone position with the

20 gun pointing upwards towards Free Derry Corner. You

21 have the hard copy of the statement in front of you,

22 I need not go to every passage, need I?

23 As I understood the evidence you have given

24 to the Tribunal this morning, you have no recollection

25 of seeing any other soldier when you looked out of the


Page 57


1 window?

2 A. But you recall my correction as well, that

3 I would not have had a full view of all of

4 Rossville Street. I would have from my point only have

5 been able to see across on to that pavement.

6 Q. Into the road as well?

7 A. Well, not more than, um, one-third of one

8 side of the road.

9 Q. Were you aware, for example, of a soldier

10 walking or running down that road at about that point,

11 shooting his gun willy-nilly from the hip?

12 A. Well, you take it -- if you even look at this

13 desk now and I have a much higher view than I had of

14 the windowsill, I cannot see what is down in front of

15 me here. I can see across -- the trajectory of my

16 sight does not permit me to see what is on this side

17 (indicating) or contiguous to the building.

18 Q. The answer is no?

19 A. You asked me what I saw?

20 Q. I asked you if you saw or were aware of a

21 soldier walking or running down past where you were in

22 the flats shooting from the hip?

23 A. Which side of the road would that have been

24 on?

25 Q. On the side of the road that you were


Page 58


1 overlooking?

2 A. On the side of the road --

3 Q. On Rossville Street itself. I cannot give

4 you a precise position, I want you to know, if you can

5 assist the Inquiry, whether you saw or whether you

6 heard what apparently was, more particularly whether

7 you saw a soldier walking or running down and about the

8 area you have indicated where the man was prone, and

9 shooting from the hip?

10 A. On that side I did not see -- I cannot say if

11 it was in the middle of the road, if someone was doing

12 it on the middle of the road or on the side of the

13 road, Rossville Street, contiguous to the

14 Rossville Flats, I would not have had a view of that,

15 so I cannot comment.

16 Q. Can I ask you, please, about a few other

17 matters arising from your earlier evidence? Could you

18 have on the screen KL2.2, please, paragraph 5, about

19 which you were asked some questions by Mr Clarke -- I

20 shall not repeat a single one of those.

21 Do you see four lines from the foot of the

22 passage that is on the screen is reference to, in your

23 words "the few mal contents" in the North Derry CRA who

24 belonged to the Official Republicans?

25 A. Yes.


Page 59


1 Q. Who were the few mal contents?

2 A. There I am referring to a small group who

3 were more concern -- they would probably have been more

4 of the Republican Clubs and they were more concerned

5 with petition signing, holding seminars or collective

6 ownership of wealth and such matters and -- whereas we

7 were, insofar as we held seminars, much more keen on

8 issues pertinent on identity where we sought to engage

9 the Protestant community and the community relations

10 commission on their sense of identity, whether they

11 were British, whether they were Irish, whether they

12 were Ulster, whether they were both. So that was the

13 kind of mal contents I was talking about.

14 Q. My question was: who were the few mal

15 contents?

16 A. This is in North Derry Civil Rights

17 Association?

18 Q. Yes?

19 A. Do you want names?

20 Q. Please.

21 A. I would need to, again, have some recall of

22 those names, and I think it would be unfair from this

23 authority to have the name "mal content" around anyone

24 30 years later when they are perfectly civilised

25 citizens and they were only expressing a different


Page 60


1 point of view from the point of view that was at our

2 meetings. They had nothing whatever to do with any

3 attempt -- they had never any advocation of violence.

4 Indeed, sir, if I was to recall any one occasion on

5 North Derry's CRA where there was an occasion where

6 anyone proposed violence, it was the two, what we would

7 call "agents provocateurs" that the Security Forces had

8 within our organisation.

9 They brought, at one stage, to us a map of

10 the army barracks at Ballykelly, its water supply; they

11 had a ready supply, they said, of strychnine and they

12 would have made that available to us. We dismissed it

13 out of hand. We could see it a mile away; it was a

14 setup by the Security Forces to try to implicate the

15 North Derry CRA in a violent act and we would have no

16 part of it.

17 Q. Mass murder, putting strychnine in the water

18 supply?

19 A. That was what those who were in the

20 organisation at the behest of the Security Forces were

21 proposing to is. If you call that mass murder, I am

22 prepared to agree with you.

23 Q. That is what it sounds like, putting

24 strychnine in the water supply is what you are saying

25 they were procuring you to do. These are the people


Page 61


1 you refer to in paragraph 14 of your statement, are

2 they, at KL2.5?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I do not want you to name them at the moment;

5 do you remember who they were?

6 A. I do.

7 Q. You say there "they were allowed to remain as

8 members of the association"?

9 A. They were, where do I say -- I would be of

10 the view that, long before John Major, that having them

11 in the tent rather than outside the tent was the best

12 way to deal with them.

13 Q. And they remained, what, through 1972, did

14 they, in the organisation?

15 A. I think so, yeah.

16 Q. Are you prepared privately to identify them

17 to the Inquiry?

18 A. One is now dead.

19 Q. And the other?

20 A. I have no idea where he is.

21 Q. Are you prepared to identify them privately

22 to the Inquiry? I presume you do not want publicly to

23 declare their identity and I do not ask that you do so;

24 will you give the Inquiry their names in private?

25 A. If the Inquiry can persuade me that it is


Page 62


1 useful to the Inquiry, then I am ready to do that, yes.

2 Q. You seem fit, Mr Logue, have you not, to make

3 the allegation and now to allege that these people in

4 fact sought to incite, amongst other things, mass

5 murder. We have no way and the Inquiry has no way of

6 verifying that unless you are prepared to give the

7 names?

8 LORD SAVILLE: I think Mr Logue has said he

9 is prepared to give the Inquiry the names if the

10 Inquiry thinks it is worth pursuing this matter; did

11 I understand you correctly, Mr Logue.

12 MR LAWSON: Well, he said even if the Inquiry

13 persuades him to do so.

14 MR TOOHEY: I have to say, Mr Lawson, I think

15 Mr Logue was rather led into this by the line of

16 questioning. That is not to suggest the questioning

17 was any way unfair or improper, but I think it has

18 developed through the questioning.

19 MR LAWSON: Sir, you are absolutely right.

20 I was going to come to that passage of his statement in

21 due course, but Mr Logue mentioned these people in the

22 context of another topic I was exploring with him. Be

23 that as it may, I am sorry if I interrupted Mr Clarke

24 who, I think, was about to say something.

25 MR CLARKE: I was about to say it is slightly


Page 63


1 academic. We do know who the names of these people are

2 as they were in what we know from Eversheds discussions

3 with this witness who they are.

4 MR LAWSON: You have already told the

5 Inquiry?

6 MR CLARKE: Yes.

7 MR LAWSON: Sorry, I would not have wasted

8 time had I known that.

9 Can I ask you this, sir, generally about

10 NICRA. It is right, is it, there was somewhat of a

11 lull in the activities of NICRA after 1969 and before

12 internment?

13 A. Well, I only joined NICRA in 1970 and I think

14 there was a lull prior to internment.

15 Q. Do you agree that the introduction of

16 internment gave what has been described as "a real shot

17 in the arm" to the civil rights movement, enabling it

18 to come back with a bang; you may not agree with the

19 precise words, but do you agree with that sentiment?

20 A. I believe that it was unthinkable for

21 something like internment to have been introduced and

22 for one not to confront it as NICRA did. There was a

23 real anger in the community and it was important that

24 that anger was channelled into non-violent means and

25 the complete withdrawal of consent by the citizens from


Page 64


1 the institutions was assisted in a non-violent manner

2 and NICRA provided an useful means of doing that.

3 Q. I am seeking your comment on what someone

4 else has said, but I will move on. Let me ask you

5 about this: Magilligan, and the march at Magilligan.

6 Was that a NICRA or NICRA approved demonstration?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You indicated in your evidence today that

9 your, that is the North Derry CRA's assurances to NICRA

10 would have been fully accepted?

11 A. That is right.

12 Q. So the march was approved by NICRA itself?

13 A. They were aware of it, and given endorsement

14 -- would have given an endorsement.

15 Q. So the march was held, was it, in accordance

16 with NICRA guidelines?

17 A. NICRA guidelines, in terms of the selection

18 of speakers, the stewarding, yes.

19 Q. Can you help as to this from your local

20 knowledge, the Andersonstown Civil Resistance Movement,

21 what was that?

22 A. I have no idea.

23 Q. No idea?

24 A. In terms of local knowledge, Andersonstown is

25 70, 80 miles away. It is the west of Belfast; we are


Page 65


1 in the north of Derry.

2 Q. They were invited to the march?

3 A. Were they?

4 Q. At Magilligan?

5 A. No-one was invited. There was ads placed in

6 the newspapers and everybody was encouraged to turn up.

7 Q. I just wonder as the Tribunal has a video

8 with a very, very large banner of that organisation;

9 you do not know who they are, though?

10 A. People were invited to bring their banners

11 and identify themselves and people regularly walked

12 behind their own banner.

13 Q. It was not just civil rights banners?

14 A. There were all banners, there were civil

15 rights banners. You said the Andersonstown Civil

16 Rights --

17 Q. Civil Resistance Movement; I just wondered if

18 you knew what it was?

19 A. No, I do not.

20 Q. Two other matters, then, in relation to

21 Magilligan: you indicate in your statement, if we

22 highlight the bottom part of page 8 at KL2. I will not

23 ask you to go back to it, having earlier in the

24 statement perceived the imperative nature of having to

25 get to Magilligan soon after it opened you remember


Page 66


1 telling the Tribunal about, you there say on the

2 penultimate paragraph on the screen:

3 "Our intention was to get as close to the

4 prison as possible"; do you see that?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. To do what?

7 A. To allow the internees to be aware of our

8 presence.

9 Q. What were you going to do when you got there?

10 A. We would probably have handed a letter of

11 protest and returned, like we did on our previous

12 occasions.

13 Q. That was all you wanted to do: turn up at the

14 prison, give them a letter of protest and go away

15 again?

16 A. Having demonstrated clearly public support

17 for -- public opposition to the introduction of

18 internment. I think you must understand, sir, at that

19 point Magilligan had to be confronted because not only

20 was it internment, but the setting up of Magilligan

21 indicated that for the Government it was their

22 intention to continue with internment; internment was

23 there to stay, it was not a short-term policy, so that

24 had to be confronted.

25 Q. Can I ask you about one further matter in


Page 67


1 relation to Magilligan: It arises in this way: if you

2 remember my learned friend Mr Clarke, Counsel for the

3 Inquiry, asked you about -- for your comment on the

4 suggestion of people seeking to get around the barbed

5 wire fence or barricade by going into the sea; do you

6 remember?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Your reaction was to say, well, that might be

9 what the army say?

10 A. I think I gave your learned friend Mr Clarke

11 and comprehensive answer on that in terms of the wire

12 coming down to the water -- the high water mark and

13 people trying to turn around, get beyond that point,

14 indeed into the water to do so.

15 Q. Can I ask for your assistance and your

16 commentary upon some contemporaneous material; it is

17 the last thing I want to ask you about. Would you

18 look, please, on the screen with me at L9, which, as

19 you can see is an article entitled "The Brutal

20 Soldiery" written by somebody called Simon Hoggart.

21 I can tell you it comes from the Guardian newspaper of

22 25th January 1972.

23 The passage I draw your attention and which

24 I invite your comment, can we look at the first column

25 on the left and start from, I think it is the third


Page 68


1 paragraph:

2 "The march at Magilligan ...".

3 By all means take your time to read it to

4 yourself. You will see the first two of the paragraphs

5 on the page refer to a suggestion that Colonel Welsh

6 offered tea and buns, rejected by Mr O'Kane, who led

7 the demonstrators along the muddy track three miles up

8 the beach.

9 Do you see that; does that ring a bell?

10 A. Yes, as does the massive foam generating

11 machine.

12 Q. Then, it continues:

13 "Here troops had unrolled a long roll of

14 barbed wire across the beach to stop the crowd getting

15 within view of the huts and watch towers"; is that

16 right?

17 A. That is right, as far as I recall.

18 Q. "Behind the wire were ranged a company of

19 Green Jackets, about 80 men of the First Battalion of

20 the Parachute Regiment, as well as about 80 police."

21 There were certainly Green Jackets, paras and

22 police there, were there not?

23 A. Yes, my recollection was that the

24 Green Jackets were in front and the paras were behind;

25 I cannot be sure.


Page 69


1 Q. Then this in particular:

2 "Trouble started when a small portion of the

3 crowd took advantage of the low tide to try to sneak

4 round the seaward end of the barbed wire coils. As

5 they did so paratroopers opened fire with volley after

6 volley of rubber bullets, hitting several demonstrators

7 who buckled up into the seawater, causing the crowd to

8 charge over to their help ..."

9 Then there is reference to hand-to-hand

10 fighting and batons, rubber bullets, et cetera being

11 used.

12 That is how that particular reporter

13 described the trouble starting. You were there; do you

14 agree with that?

15 A. I agree with a great deal of what is there.

16 The rubber bullets -- what he has left unsaid is that

17 the volley of rubber bullets that were fired were fired

18 as the people who ran towards the sea began to run from

19 the march towards the sea. They had not got to the sea

20 and they had not got round the wire or anything else.

21 Your soldiers panicked and started firing right away,

22 so that those people would be prevented from ever

23 getting round that side.

24 Q. Sir, the violence, if you like, began, you

25 agree with this, when some of the demonstrators


Page 70


1 indicated they were going to try to get round the

2 barrier?

3 A. They went into the sea to try to circumvent

4 the barbed wire.

5 Q. I think that is, yes, is it not?

6 Questioned by MR ELIAS

7 MR ELIAS: Mr Logue, would you accept that,

8 leaving aside the question of infiltration by the IRA

9 -- I do not suggest it in the sense of --

10 A. Can I ask who are you?

11 Q. My name is Elias and I act for a number of

12 former soldiers and military personnel. Leaving aside

13 the question of infiltration by IRA members of NICRA,

14 in the sense that they may have influenced the

15 organisation, either at Executive level or at any local

16 level, would you accept that within NICRA, either at

17 its Executive level or locally, there could have been

18 at the time we are discussing persons on committees and

19 active within NICRA who in fact were active IRA

20 members?

21 A. I really have to say to you, sir, that

22 I cannot believe that you say you leave aside

23 infiltration, I cannot believe that you are still

24 peddling this line, that there are IRA people or IRA

25 sympathisers on the Executive or holding any authority


Page 71


1 within the civil rights movement.

2 As I recall, the Cameron Commission said, and

3 I have written it down because I have seen this so

4 often:

5 "There was no sign that they were dominant or

6 in a position to control or direct the policy of

7 NICRA. There were no signs that the IRA were members

8 of the association."

9 Q. I peddle no line, sir, at all, I ask you a

10 question: you were not aware, you have told the

11 Tribunal a little earlier, if it be the case, that

12 Liam McMillen was active and a senior man in the IRA;

13 that is correct, is it not?

14 A. I said -- you have again said "if it be the

15 case". No-one has yet proved to me that Liam McMillen

16 -- I said to you that he signed up to -- I took

17 everyone at face value, I was inclusive and that

18 Liam McMillen was a signed-up person of the Civil

19 Rights Executive, committed to non-violence.

20 If Liam McMillen had at any stage or at any

21 time either acted violently or proposed violence,

22 I would have confronted him, I can assure you of that.

23 Q. By what means, to take that example, did he

24 sign up to non-violence?

25 A. By being a member of the Northern Ireland


Page 72


1 Civil Rights Executive, I assume, that he accepted the

2 constitution of that Executive.

3 Q. That assumption would have been made in any

4 case, would it, without further investigation of the

5 individual concerned or his or her background?

6 A. I think people's word was taken, yes.

7 Q. May I ask you about paragraph 48 of your

8 statement, quite a different matter, and about the shot

9 that you believe to have been, perhaps the duller sound

10 coming from the Free Derry Corner side. You were in

11 the ambulance at the time you hear that shot, were you?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did you have any idea of where that shot came

14 from, apart from saying the Free Derry Corner side of

15 the Rossville Flats?

16 A. None.

17 Q. Did you have any idea of how far away from

18 you the shot appeared to have been fired?

19 A. None, other than that I assume the sharper

20 shot was probably closer. I mean, I have no knowledge

21 of arms at all, so I cannot say, no.

22 Q. Could the shot, for example, have been from,

23 talking of the lower, of the duller sound shot, could

24 it for example have been from the Rossville Flats

25 itself?


Page 73


1 A. I think I made clear a number of times that

2 I do not believe for one second that there was anyone

3 firing from the Rossville Flats, otherwise the soldier

4 mentioned in my statement would have been a sitting

5 target, so I do not -- it never crossed my mind for a

6 second, I have never contemplated and I have never

7 accepted General Ford's and other agencies' suggestion

8 that there was anyone firing from Rossville Flats. It

9 would have been so easy to have shot the soldier that

10 I saw if that had been the case, so I do not think, in

11 relation to the ambulance, that it could have been

12 anywhere near there because the ambulance was right

13 beside Rossville Flats.

14 Q. So, apart from saying that it was south of

15 the ambulance, you cannot assist us further?

16 A. I said Free Derry Corner or beyond.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 MR CLARKE: Just two matters.

19 Could we have hotspot 11, please? This is a

20 picture taken recently of Glenfada Park North and you

21 can see that there is, on what is now the right-hand

22 side of the screen, a pram ramp. If I zoom slightly

23 you can see that in front of Glenfada Park itself there

24 is a low wall about five bricks high which runs

25 parallel to the block as it goes down towards Free


Page 74


1 Derry Corner.

2 As I understand your evidence, the soldier

3 whom you saw was somewhere just at the north of this

4 block, and you mentioned something, which I am afraid

5 I did not quite pick up, about his position in relation

6 to what I think you may have been referring to as this

7 small wall we see here; have I understood that

8 correctly?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. He was lying on the ground; was he close to

11 the wall, was any part of him on the wall?

12 A. The wall was a backdrop to him. I would not

13 have thought that he was more than a metre from the

14 wall and he was lying on the ground. My impression,

15 Mr Clarke, is that he had his elbows on the ground.

16 His head would have been higher, if you know what

17 I mean.

18 Q. But the wall was, as you say, a backdrop to

19 where he was?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. The last matter I wanted to ask you --

22 LORD SAVILLE: I am wondering, if we take the

23 artist's panorama of the virtual reality, -- this,

24 Mr Logue, is partly modern photographer, but also

25 superimposing on the other side of the street an


Page 75


1 impression of the Rossville Street Flats. If we did a

2 complete 180 degrees swing round, you may or may not be

3 able to help us a little further on this question. It

4 was only an idea. There they are, they are the flats.

5 Swing on round. We can come back to the view that you

6 were shown. That is an impression of the barricade,

7 coming on round we come back to the picture Mr Clarke

8 showed you. I do not know whether that assists you in

9 any way to help us any more on the position of the

10 soldier who you say you saw?

11 A. Thank you, Chairman. What I think would be

12 of assistance would be to know, the diagonal across

13 from -- I think it is the second rather than the first,

14 the second flat on the first road where that came

15 across, was that the first or second balcony there,

16 that is what I really --

17 LORD SAVILLE: A photograph might possibly

18 show that. I was thinking of a general photograph

19 looking down on the Rossville Street Flats from which

20 one might be able to see across to the Glenfada side.

21 MR CLARKE: Yes, there is one somewhere.

22 There is a photograph taken from the flats, I cannot

23 for the moment remember where it is.

24 A. My recollection, Chairman, is that the flats

25 begin a little bit further down and are not directly


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1 opposite.

2 LORD SAVILLE: Perhaps, while we are looking

3 for the photograph, if we look at KL2.38, we have the

4 map. We have the map up at the moment, Mr Clarke. You

5 see where you have put your "C" on the map?

6 A. Yes.

7 LORD SAVILLE: The low wall we have just seen

8 in the photograph starts more or less immediately

9 behind that letter "C" and runs southwards down to the

10 rubble barricade as marked?

11 A. May I -- if we begin with the letter "A",

12 the top of block A, and you come down, still staying

13 within that box and you go directly across, then

14 diagonally across, comme ca, yeah, I think we are a

15 little further north than that. We are clearly not

16 talking of the soldier being under the first parapet,

17 therefore, of Glenfada Park, we are talking of either

18 the second or the third.

19 MR CLARKE: Yes, I follow. The best I can do

20 --

21 LORD SAVILLE: By "parapet" you mean balcony?

22 A. Balcony.

23 MR CLARKE: The best I can do is EP35.18:

24 this is a photograph that has been taken from the

25 Rossville Flats itself, though I suspect from a little


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1 further south to the position where you were, but it

2 does show the sort of view you get from a flat in --

3 A. But I think it is either the second or third

4 that we are looking at here, because first -- it is too

5 far north to be directly -- to be diagonally across

6 from Rossville.

7 LORD SAVILLE: I think Mr Hoyt has a couple

8 of suggestions for photographs.

9 MR HOYT: P204, P209.

10 LORD SAVILLE: P209 is possibly, looking at

11 the hard copy, a good one. That is the sort of

12 photograph I had in mind that may or may not help.

13 Does that help you at all, do you think?

14 A. Yes, well you take -- let us come down there

15 and come directly across, so I think we are looking

16 at -- yes, I would be looking more at the second.

17 LORD SAVILLE: That, I think, looking at the

18 second possibly, second balcony, that is to say. We

19 all appreciate you cannot necessarily be too exact, but

20 would the arrow you put on the screen here indicate as

21 best you can the position?

22 A. Where is Glenfada? This is Glenfada, or

23 this?. (Marked with a blue arrow).

24 LORD SAVILLE: The tip of your arrow is just

25 up against the eastern wall of Glenfada Park North?


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1 A. The second, the second balcony.

2 LORD SAVILLE: It might be worth keeping that

3 one.

4 MR CLARKE: Can we save that, please, and

5 give it the number KL2.42?

6 The only last thing I wanted to ask you,

7 Mr Logue, is this: in relation to Civil Rights

8 Associations, we see in the papers sometimes a

9 reference to North Derry and sometimes a reference to

10 Derry county.

11 Are they the same in this context?

12 A. They should not be, but as it turned out,

13 North Derry was much more active than South Derry and

14 we worked together and we tended to be, as I say, more

15 responsive and prompt. South Derry, insofar as it

16 operated, was much more Maghera, Magherafelt,

17 Castledawson, that part --

18 Q. Was there a North Derry Civil Rights

19 Association and a South Derry Civil Rights Association?

20 A. There was.

21 Q. If we see in the papers Derry county in the

22 context of civil rights, which one would it mean, or

23 would it be ambiguous?

24 A. I am not sure obviously, I cannot.

25 Q. If you cannot be sure, we cannot be sure


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1 either?

2 LORD SAVILLE: Mr Logue, thank you very much

3 indeed for coming here to assist the Inquiry. Thank

4 you very much. It is mid-day, Mr Clarke, I think we