1 Monday, 2nd February 2004
2 (9.40 am)
3 MR IVAN COOPER, sworn
4 Questioned by MR CLARKE
5 LORD SAVILLE: I see that Mr Frankson has already pointed
6 you in my direction, so I will say to you what I say to
7 all the witnesses. I am the Chairman. The questions
8 will come from the barristers in front of me. Could you
9 remember to keep close to that microphone on your desk,
10 you can pull it towards you if you like, and then we
11 will be able to hear what you have to say.
12 MR CLARKE: Mr Cooper, you have made four statements to this
13 Tribunal, the first page of the first of which is on the
14 screen. The second is at KC12.81, which is signed on
15 8th April 2002. The third is at KC12.95, which was
16 signed on 19th August 2002, and the fourth is the
17 KC12.108, which was signed on 3rd February 2003.
18 Are the contents of those statements true to the
19 best of your knowledge and belief?
20 A. Yes, they are.
21 Q. I should explain that everybody in this room has had the
22 opportunity to read those statements so I am not going
23 to go through them piece by piece but take matters that
24 arise out of them. I should also explain that certain
25 individuals have been held entitled to anonymity in
1 these proceedings or have been given anonymity pro tem,
2 largely members or alleged members of either wing of the
3 IRA, so you may find that what appears on the screen has
4 either a cipher or a blank where your copy of the
5 statement has a name. Please do not mention the true
6 name of the person if that occurs; that may well require
7 some degree of circumlocution, but we will deal with
8 that if and as and when it arises.
9 Could we go back, please, to KC12.14, the first page
10 of your statement, paragraph 2. You describe in
11 paragraph 2 the march which took place in this city,
12 organised by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
13 Association on 5th October 1968 and the meeting that
14 followed it on 9th October of that year at a hotel in
15 Derry, as a result of which the Derry Citizens Action
16 Committee was formed.
17 I do not want to go into this in any detail because
18 it is way before Bloody Sunday, but could you help me on
19 one thing: there is reference in some of the documents
20 to an organisation called the DHAC, which I think is the
21 Derry Housing Action Committee?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Did they have anything to do with the original march on
24 5th October 1968?
25 A. I do not think they were formed at that stage, but the
1 primary reason for the march on 5th October was directly
2 related to housing.
3 Q. Was it organised, so far as people in Derry were
4 concerned, by people who were concerned about housing
5 issues?
6 A. The decision to hold the march on 5th October 1968 was
7 taken on the steps of this building after a housing
8 protest in the chamber.
9 Q. Is it right that after the march there had been several
10 days of rioting in the city?
11 A. In 1968?
12 Q. Yes?
13 A. There was not significant rioting. Some windows were
14 broken in the centre of the city, but I would not have
15 described it as "significant rioting", compared to what
16 we learned in following years.
17 Q. You say that:
18 "The Derry Citizens Action Committee was formed,
19 which was determined to raise and address the issue of
20 civil rights in Derry in a more autonomous way than the
21 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was able to
22 do."
23 What exactly did you mean by "a more autonomous
24 way"?
25 A. Derry was the Achilles's heel of the entire civil rights
1 problem in Northern Ireland. This is where we had
2 gerrymandering in a very blatant way. This is where it
3 was easy to illustrate the -- in a very, very strong way
4 the absence of the franchise; it also characterised the
5 use of housing as a tool to prevent people having votes
6 in local government elections, so Derry was, was
7 consistent with the entire denial of civil rights and,
8 therefore, it was felt that we should have an
9 organisation in the city capable of highlighting our
10 various denials of civil rights.
11 Q. When you use the expression "in a more autonomous way
12 than the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
13 Association," does that in effect mean in a way that was
14 specifically related to Derry?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was there also a desire to have a body -- in the event
17 the Derry Citizens Action Committee -- that was not
18 Republican-controlled or influenced?
19 A. There were people who were members of the committee of
20 15; there were 15 members on the Derry Citizens Action
21 Committee and some of them, it was known, were
22 Republicans. I would not have described the
23 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association as being
24 dominated by Republicans. So there were members drawn
25 from the Republican community in the Derry Citizens
1 Action Committee.
2 Q. May we come, please, to paragraphs 3 to 5 on this page.
3 You describe in paragraph 4 how, in 1969 you were
4 elected as the Member of Parliament for mid-Derry and,
5 as a result of having your constituency
6 responsibilities, you did not assume the same degree of
7 hands-on responsibility in the non-violent struggle for
8 civil rights.
9 Did you in fact cease to be the Chairman of the
10 Derry Citizens Action Committee after you became
11 a Member of Parliament?
12 A. Not immediately after, but it was felt that with the
13 attainment of most of the civil rights demands which
14 occurred the latter part 1968 and then the election of
15 three civil rights Members of Parliament into the
16 Stormont Parliament, it was felt that the Derry Citizens
17 Action Committee did not really have a continuing
18 function.
19 So it was, to a large degree phased out.
20 Q. You describe in paragraph 5 the introduction of
21 internment without trial, which we know came in on
22 9th August 1971. You describe how you were arrested in
23 Laburnum Terrace in that month, by a troop under the
24 command of Paddy Ashdown.
25 Is it right your arrest and one of the others was
1 that that led to the well-known case of Regina v The
2 Londonderry Justices, which held that the Stormont
3 Government did not have power to confer powers of arrest
4 on the Army?
5 A. That is so.
6 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 6 on the next page.
7 You describe in that paragraph being on the march at
8 Magilligan, how that was the first time you became
9 conscious of the role of the Paras and how they struck
10 you, putting it shortly, as very belligerent. Were you
11 injured in any way on that march?
12 A. Yes, I was.
13 Q. In what way?
14 A. I had been struck by a rubber bullet which had been
15 fired by a member of the Parachute Regiment, struck on
16 the head.
17 Q. Could I have on the screen, please, KC12.31. Can I tell
18 you what this is, appended to your statement. It is the
19 transcript of an interview with you, portions of which
20 appeared in the documentary "Secret History", which was
21 broadcast on television in the late 1990s.
22 Do you remember being interviewed for that
23 programme?
24 A. No, I do not.
25 Q. Can we have KC12.32. It is a relatively small point.
1 But in the account of what happened at Magilligan, you
2 are recorded as saying, this:
3 "... and for the first time I came face to face with
4 paratroopers and they were a different kettle of fish to
5 what we had normally had in Derry amongst the military
6 fraternity. These were really tough individuals and
7 indeed I suffered at the hands of the paratroopers at
8 Magilligan beach because immediately after talking to
9 a senior police officer, a sergeant fired a rubber
10 bullet and knocked me cold for over half an hour, so
11 this was a different breed of soldier."
12 That was a reference, was it, to a sergeant in the
13 paratroopers?
14 A. Yes, it was.
15 Q. May we come, back, please, to KC12.15, paragraphs 7 to
16 9. You say in paragraph 7:
17 "In hindsight the protest at Magilligan was futile
18 as the marchers were diverted on to Magilligan beach"
19 and it achieved no more than publicity, which
20 highlighted the fact that there was an internment camp
21 at Magilligan.
22 What more had it aimed to achieve?
23 A. The intention had been for people to handcuff themselves
24 to the entrances to the camp, non-violent protest, the
25 use of handcuffs and sitting down at the entrances to
1 the camp; that had been the objective.
2 Q. Who had organised Magilligan?
3 A. North Derry Civil Rights Association.
4 Q. You then describe in paragraph 9 how you had a very
5 minor part to play in the organisation of the march
6 which was to take place on 30th January. You say that
7 the Derry Citizens Action Committee may have had some
8 informal involvement in the organisation, but the march
9 was organised principally by a local committee of NICRA.
10 Kevin McCorry, the full-time NICRA man, was mainly
11 responsible for the organisation of the march.
12 Were you a member of NICRA?
13 A. Yes, I was, and the Derry Citizens Action Committee,
14 when it was in existence, was affiliated to NICRA.
15 Q. What was the very minor part that you had to play in the
16 organisation of the march?
17 A. Well, immediately after Magilligan, a number of
18 individuals had approached me about the consequences of
19 the use of the paratroopers at Magilligan. In addition
20 to that I was involved in consultations with the local
21 organisers; I was spoken, on a number of occasions --
22 I was spoken to on a number of occasions by Kevin
23 McCorry; on occasions I expressed reservations about
24 aspects.
25 Q. Can you remember what aspects you had reservations
1 about?
2 A. Originally the intention was to have several marches,
3 marches converging on the Guildhall. That sort of plan
4 would have entailed a very large number of stewards and
5 I did not believe that the manpower would be there in
6 order to have those feeder parades.
7 Q. Were there any other aspects that you expressed concern
8 about?
9 A. When you are organising a march you are always concerned
10 about confrontation with Loyalists and every step would
11 be taken to avoid confrontation and conflict.
12 Q. May we have, please, on the screen, paragraphs 10 to the
13 end. You describe in paragraph 10 how, within your own
14 political grouping, there was debate as to whether the
15 march should be supported. When it was discussed at
16 formal party level, there were three MPs in favour of
17 the march, two opposed to the march and Austin Currie
18 assumed a neutral role.
19 What was the basic ground of opposition of John Hume
20 and Gerry Fitt which caused them to take the stance that
21 they did?
22 A. I would remind you that John Hume attended the march at
23 Magilligan.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. So he witnessed at first hand the tactics of the
1 paratroopers. The reservations of John Hume and
2 Gerry Fitt hinged around what had been witnessed, and
3 the account given by John Hume and myself to the
4 meeting; the reservations were purely around the use of
5 the paratroopers.
6 Q. Austin Currie's neutrality, it may be difficult to
7 explain a neutral position, but was there a reason?
8 A. I cannot, I cannot recollect it.
9 Q. Can we come over the page, please, to paragraph 12. You
10 say there that you were concerned:
11 "... that the IRA would view the march by the
12 dynamic and powerful civil rights movement as an
13 opportunity to create a confrontation with the military
14 and the Security Forces."
15 When you use the expression "to create
16 a confrontation," what sort of confrontation were you
17 apprehending?
18 A. I was not apprehending any confrontation, I was
19 concerned that the IRA would endeavour to use the civil
20 rights march as an opportunity to fire shots or
21 something else at the military. In other words, I was
22 concerned that they would use the civil rights march.
23 Q. The Tribunal has been given a fair amount of evidence
24 including evidence from members of both wings of the IRA
25 that the IRA would not and did not use civil rights
1 marches as an opportunity to fire at or to attack the
2 Security Forces.
3 Nevertheless, that was something you feared they
4 might do, was it?
5 A. It was always a matter of concern. You have got to
6 remember that we had many civil rights marches in 1968
7 and 1969; a considerable period had elapsed until this
8 march was being held. In other words, quite some months
9 had elapsed and in that interim period the IRA had
10 become active. Therefore, it was a new consideration;
11 it was a new part of the equation. I did not have any
12 specific knowledge that they were going to do that,
13 I simply wanted to make certain that the occasion would
14 not be used.
15 Q. Had you had any experience in the past in which either
16 wing of the IRA had used a civil rights march as an
17 opportunity to confront the Security Forces?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Could we have on the screen KC12.35. This is another
20 portion of the interview, part of which became the
21 programme "Secret History." There is an expression that
22 is attributed to you, the very top of the page:
23 "The IRA had latched on to civil rights
24 demonstrations."
25 Do you know what you would have meant by the phrase:
1 "The IRA had latched on to civil rights
2 demonstrations"?
3 A. Individuals who could quite clearly be identified as
4 people who were involved with the IRA.
5 Q. In what way had they latched on, you mean simply taken
6 part in or something else?
7 A. Taken part in.
8 Q. May we come, please, back to KC12.16, paragraphs 12 to
9 13. You describe in paragraph 12 how, because of your
10 concern, a few days prior to the march you approached an
11 intermediary and asked him to make arrangements on your
12 behalf for you to meet a representative of the IRA.
13 Was that intermediary, so far as you were aware,
14 himself a member of the IRA?
15 A. Absolutely not.
16 Q. Who was the intermediary?
17 A. Paddy Devlin, MP.
18 Q. You then met four members of the IRA, three of whom you
19 already knew. Do you recall whereabouts you met --
20 A. In Creggan.
21 Q. In the Creggan. When we are talking about the IRA, we
22 are talking about the Provisional wing, are we?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You knew three of them. Did you know what position they
25 held in the Provisionals?
1 A. I only knew the position held by one of them.
2 Q. What position was that?
3 A. What they call in local terms, the OC.
4 Q. On the small machine to your left, if Mr Frankson could
5 show you, I have sent to you a name. Please do not
6 mention the name, but was the person whom you are
7 referring to as the OC the individual whose name now
8 appears upon your computer by your left-hand side?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. So far as the other two whom you knew are concerned,
11 please do not mention their name but would you be able
12 to type in on that machine the true name of those two
13 persons. (Pause). (Handed)
14 You have written, as I understand it, on this piece
15 of paper the names of the other three insofar as known;
16 is that right?
17 A. (Witness nodding)
18 Q. And some of them only by their surname. I should say
19 that the name of one of them is the individual known to
20 us as PIRA 17 and the surname of one of them is the
21 surname of either PIRA 9 or PIRA 10.
22 You say there that at this meeting you made it
23 absolutely clear that the march would have to be
24 a non-violent march with no involvement by the IRA:
25 "... failing which I would use my influence to seek
1 to have the march cancelled" and sought an assurance to
2 this effect.
3 Apart from yourself and the four members of the IRA
4 whom you saw, was anybody else present at the meeting?
5 A. No. Can I make the point --
6 Q. Yes?
7 A. -- that not all members of the IRA were present during
8 the meeting; there was quite a bit of coming out and in
9 of doors.
10 Q. I think you say somewhere -- I do not have the reference
11 in mind -- that there were two people who were there as
12 it were all the time?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And two who wandered in and wandered out; is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You record in paragraph 13 that you received
17 confirmation 48 hours after the meeting that the IRA
18 would locate itself on the Creggan and would confine
19 itself to the Creggan estate while the march proceeded.
20 How did you receive that confirmation?
21 A. By telephone.
22 Q. Was it one of the four who telephoned you or somebody
23 else?
24 A. It was one of the four.
25 Q. It is obvious from the fact that you did not receive
1 confirmation until 48 hours after your meeting that you
2 were not given an immediate assurance that there would
3 be no involvement by the IRA. Do you recall what, if
4 anything, was the official reaction to your request for
5 such an assurance?
6 A. It is not unusual if you have been involved in meetings,
7 as I have in the past with the IRA, it is not unusual
8 that they do not give an immediate reaction. The normal
9 procedure is that they listen, and I presume they report
10 to somewhere else and come back -- or they reached
11 a decision themselves after that, but it is not abnormal
12 that you have to wait.
13 Q. Could we have on the screen KC12.38. This is another
14 part of the interview for the "Secret History"
15 programme. There is a passage where this is attributed
16 to you. You are asked:
17 "Question: And did he give you that undertaking?"
18 Your reply was:
19 "I had to wait until the Thursday, which was what,
20 two days prior to the march, before I was contacted
21 again ..."
22 Do you have a recollection that it was on the
23 Thursday that you were contacted?
24 A. It was the Thursday, but that is more than two days
25 prior to the march, but it was the Thursday.
1 Q. You were then asked this:
2 "Question: Why should you believe that undertaking
3 as real?"
4 The reply was this:
5 "This is a very small community and I have been
6 coming to the Bogside since I was 12 years of age.
7 I worked in the shirt factory, it is a small community,
8 your ear was very close to the ground. I was satisfied,
9 extremely satisfied that I had got that assurance.
10 I had also believed that he would process it through the
11 channels that they had to, but from other contacts
12 I had, I was satisfied that he had gone through the
13 channels."
14 Can you tell us what you were referring to in that
15 sentence; what the channels were and what the nature of
16 the contact was that made you satisfied that he had gone
17 through them?
18 A. Well, I, I presume that because the march had been
19 billed as quite a large occasion, I assume that he had
20 to get or they had to get direction from some aspect of
21 their command structure. It was billed as a large
22 march. We had the events of Magilligan the previous
23 week and there was a great deal of coverage in the press
24 et cetera about the forthcoming march.
25 So I was satisfied from -- I do not believe that
1 I was the only person who made representations to the
2 IRA; I believe there were others.
3 Q. What was the contact you had that satisfied you the
4 proper channels had been gone through?
5 A. I had heard that a direction would be given that there
6 would be no arms in the Bogside on the day of the march.
7 Q. Is this something that you had heard from somebody other
8 than the four people you saw in the Creggan?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Was that from another member of the IRA or from --
11 A. No.
12 Q. Or from gossip or what?
13 A. No, it was substantially more than gossip. As I said to
14 you earlier on, it is my view that other people also
15 made representations and the feedback which we were
16 getting was that the decision had been taken that guns
17 would be kept out of the Bogside on the day of the
18 march.
19 Q. Do you know who else had made representations?
20 A. I believe that Brigid Bond may well have made
21 representations, I believe that some clerics had made
22 representations and I believe at least one businessman
23 made representations.
24 Q. Is that because any of those three told you that they
25 had?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Did Brigid Bond tell you that she had made
3 representations?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Was that to the Provisionals or the Officials or both?
6 A. My subject for discussion with her was the Provisionals.
7 Q. You understood from her that she also had made
8 representation to the Provisionals?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And clerics; who were you talking about?
11 A. I am talking about, about clerics who were associated
12 with the, with the St Eugene's parish.
13 Q. Who was that?
14 A. Father O'Neill.
15 Q. You understood from him that he had --
16 A. Well, I understood from him that representations had
17 been made by clerics, I do not know if he made them
18 himself.
19 Q. And the businessman?
20 A. I do not wish to say who he was.
21 Q. May we go back, please, to KC12.16. May we have
22 paragraphs 13 to 15. You say that as a result of this
23 confirmation you were fairly satisfied that there was
24 a realistic chance that the march could take place
25 without the threats of serious violence.
1 Had you had yourself any contact on this or
2 communication on this score with the Officials?
3 A. I had spoken informally to two members of the Officials,
4 but as I have said in my statement their star was on the
5 wane at this particular time. The number of people that
6 they had on the ground were diminishing rapidly, but
7 I did have informal contact with two people.
8 Q. What was the upshot of that?
9 A. They did not give me any undertakings.
10 Q. Had you asked for an undertaking?
11 A. Yes, I had.
12 Q. Did they tell you anything about what their plans were
13 or were not?
14 A. No, they did not tell me.
15 Q. We have heard quite a lot of evidence from quite a lot
16 of Officials. Would you be able to -- if Mr Frankson
17 could produce another piece of paper -- to indicate whom
18 the two Officials were to whom you spoke. (Pause).
19 (Handed)
20 One is Red Mickey Doherty, who is not anonymous, and
21 the other is OIRA 1.
22 You then describe in paragraph 14 how you also had
23 meetings with people in Derry and informal discussions
24 with the police which made you reasonably confident that
25 the march would be able to go ahead without a serious
1 outbreak of violence.
2 When you say that you had informal discussions with
3 the police, is that a reference to the conversation that
4 you talk about in the immediately following paragraph
5 with Chief Superintendent Lagan or is it a reference to
6 other discussions?
7 A. Any discussions that I had with the police were with
8 Mr Lagan. I did not have any discussions with any other
9 police officer.
10 Q. You say in paragraph 15 that a few days before the march
11 you had a telephone conversation with Mr Lagan, in the
12 course of which he asked you to explain the plans for
13 the march, that at this stage the plan was that part of
14 the march would start from Shantallow and also from the
15 Waterside. You describe how he was concerned at the
16 risk of feeder parades and, therefore, the plan was
17 changed.
18 Is what you are saying that the plan changed because
19 of something you did as a result of this conversation
20 with Mr Lagan?
21 A. No, I am not saying that.
22 Q. Did Mr Lagan's views become known and therefore the plan
23 was changed; is there a causal link between the
24 conversation and the change or --
25 A. Undoubtedly there was a link. Mr Lagan was particularly
1 concerned about the march planned from the Waterside.
2 There had been, there had been a march through the
3 Waterside in January 1969, which had been attacked and
4 I think that he was greatly concerned about the
5 sectarian aspect of it, that it could lead to conflict,
6 that was his main concern.
7 Q. In the light of those concerns, the Shantallow part of
8 the march never took place?
9 A. Well, people -- as the result of my conversation with
10 Mr Lagan, and as a result of my conversation with
11 a number of other people -- there were literally
12 hundreds of meetings going on. The clergy played a very
13 important part in those meetings and so did the business
14 community and I think that some pressure was brought on
15 the civil rights organisers to leave the Shantallow
16 march.
17 Q. You say in paragraph 15 that you discussed with
18 Mr Lagan:
19 "... who was well respected and generally regarded
20 by many as fair minded, whether the police would retain
21 the power to control the march or whether the march
22 would be controlled by the Army imposing its will on the
23 marchers."
24 You then make the observation:
25 "It is difficult now to say who, ultimately, was
1 actually in charge of policing" on the day.
2 When you discussed the question with Mr Lagan before
3 the day, did you get an answer to the question whether
4 the police or the Army would be controlling the march?
5 A. I do not think Mr Lagan knew himself.
6 Q. If we go back to paragraph 14, you describe in the
7 middle of it how you were slightly concerned that the
8 stewarding of the march had not been properly organised.
9 You point out that it takes a large number of
10 well-trained, well-briefed stewards to control a big
11 march and that in the past the stewarding had been to
12 a very high standard.
13 You are not the only person to have expressed,
14 before and after the march, concern about the
15 stewarding. What exactly were the arrangements for
16 stewarding this march, so far as you were aware of them?
17 A. I was not terribly aware of any proper meetings that had
18 been held where a large force of stewards was mobilised.
19 In 1968 we had a very effective stewarding machine in
20 this city and that was built up over a period of weeks
21 and stewards were trained on how to handle difficult
22 situations.
23 I was not aware that the same level of concern had
24 gone into providing the stewards for this march.
25 Q. May we come, please, to paragraphs 17 to the end on this
1 page. We come now to the day of the march itself. You
2 describe how on the morning you set off from your home,
3 which was then in Crawford Square; heard of the strong
4 military presence in the city; constant flow of people
5 talking to you; left home at around the time when Mass
6 was taken; walked south along Francis Street towards
7 St Eugene's; saw soldiers in the side streets to the
8 north of William Street.
9 Then you describe in paragraph 18 seeing Paras in
10 the vicinity of St Eugene's who were calling to people
11 on the way to Mass, saying words to the effect that they
12 would deal with them that afternoon, looking forward to
13 seeing them later, et cetera.
14 How confident are you that those people whom you saw
15 in the morning in the vicinity of the cathedral were in
16 fact paratroopers?
17 A. I am fairly confident.
18 Q. Can I tell you why I ask? The material the Tribunal has
19 suggests that the Paras may not have been deployed in
20 this area until the afternoon. What was it that caused
21 you to think that these were paratroopers?
22 A. I saw soldiers with red berets and the distinctive
23 Paratroop cap badge.
24 Q. May we come over the page, please, to paragraphs 23 and
25 following. You describe taking a number of telephone
1 calls when you got back to your home and then setting
2 off on foot to Bishop's Field, seeing Tommy McGlinchey's
3 coal lorry. You describe in the succeeding paragraphs
4 speaking to a number of people, including
5 William McKinney and Jim Wray and his father and signing
6 autographs as the crowd assembled.
7 If we come over the page, can we have paragraph 29.
8 You refer to McGlinchey's lorry leading the march as it
9 set off for the field. You say that you and the civil
10 rights leaders leading the march knew that there was
11 never any prospect that the march would be able to
12 proceed through to the Guildhall.
13 When you set off behind McGlinchey's lorry from
14 Bishop's Field, did you then know what route the march
15 was going to take?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What route did you understand that it was going to take?
18 A. I was aware that the march would not be permitted to go
19 through to the Guildhall and we had taken a decision to
20 wheel the march to the right in William Street, to the
21 right across Rossville Street and to hold the meeting at
22 Free Derry Corner.
23 Q. Who is "we"; when you say "we had taken a decision"?
24 A. The NICRA, Kevin McCorry, Brigid Bond, those that were
25 involved in the organisation of the march.
1 Q. When was that decision taken?
2 A. I had been made aware the previous day by Chief
3 Superintendent Lagan that there was no prospect of the
4 march being permitted to go through to the Guildhall.
5 I had conveyed that to several people on the previous
6 day. So, really it was a formality; there was an
7 understanding from the march set off that there was no
8 prospect of us getting through and we had to create
9 a diversion, and the diversion was the meeting at Free
10 Derry Corner.
11 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 30. You record there
12 how you were to be one of the speakers and the others
13 were Lord Brockway and Bernadette Devlin, because the
14 Reverend Terence McCaughey had cancelled. We know that
15 you went on the march and, indeed, Bernadette Devlin as
16 well.
17 Do you know what arrangements were made for
18 Lord Brockway to get to the place where he was to speak?
19 A. I do not recollect.
20 Q. Can we have, please, paragraph 31 to 34. You describe
21 in paragraph 31 the march proceeding down Southway; you
22 walked on your own a few rows behind the lorry, which
23 occasionally gained speed and you recall thinking that
24 it was being driven too fast and people near the front
25 of the march, mainly young, were able to walk freely.
1 You think that Paddy O'Hanlon was with you and you
2 describe, in paragraph 34, how the tactic of creating
3 a diversion for the march by having a meeting away from
4 the Guildhall had quickly to be put into effect by the
5 time you got to the junction with Rossville Street to
6 prevent people from approaching the barrier in
7 William Street.
8 You describe how there were stewards ahead of you,
9 further east along William Street trying to wheel people
10 away from William Street, south along Rossville Street.
11 You say you felt there should have been more stewards
12 controlling the march.
13 I would like your help as to what exactly happened
14 when the lorry got to the junction with
15 Rossville Street, and I would like to show you in that
16 connection some photographs that were taken on the day.
17 Could we have on the screen P350. This shows the
18 junction between Rossville Street and William Street.
19 We can see in this photograph the march approaching the
20 junction and at the junction itself there is
21 a scattering of people?
22 A. I cannot see the march approaching the junction.
23 Q. The march is up there; do you follow? (Indicating)
24 A. Okay, yes.
25 Q. It becomes clearer in the next photograph in the
1 sequence, which is 351, because by this stage one can
2 just see what is, I think, the lorry towards the head of
3 the march and if we have 352, which is the next in the
4 sequence, we can see a little more clearly the lorry --
5 there is its windscreen -- and we can see the civil
6 rights banner; do you follow?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. It looks from that photograph -- at any rate just from
9 the images that one can see on it -- that by the time
10 you get -- the head of the march gets to the junction
11 with Rossville Street there do not seem to be anybody
12 recognisable as stewards around at all; was that the
13 position?
14 A. No, it certainly was not the position, because if you go
15 back to the previous photograph.
16 Q. 351, please.
17 A. Yes. At that stage the march was starting to be held
18 back and at the front of the march were stewards. So in
19 addition to stewards on the ground, there were also
20 stewards who were in the march and who had made their
21 way to the front at that stage.
22 Having said that, the number of stewards, in my
23 view, for the task ahead of us was inadequate.
24 Q. I quite follow what you say about stewards coming to the
25 front of the march as it comes close to
1 Rossville Street, but am I right in thinking -- tell me
2 if I am not -- that there were not any stewards who were
3 at the junction in advance, that is to say before the
4 lorry got to the junction?
5 A. Yes, there were.
6 Q. There were?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Do you know how many there were?
9 A. I do not, no, but there were stewards.
10 Q. One problem that one sees immediately just simply by
11 looking at the land in this photograph, that once you
12 got to the junction there is a large waste area so that
13 if you had, even if you had a fairly large line of
14 stewards at the junction, it would not be that difficult
15 to get round them if you wanted to; is that a fair
16 comment?
17 A. That is a fair comment, yes.
18 Q. May we come --
19 MR TOOHEY: Mr Cooper to your right, please. When you speak
20 of a diversion that would take the march down to Free
21 Derry Corner, are you speaking of something that was
22 decided upon by the organisers and in conjunction with
23 the stewards or something that was known to the marchers
24 generally?
25 A. It was not known to the marchers generally, it was known
1 to the stewards. You would not normally communicate
2 that to the bulk of the crowd; you would not normally do
3 that. It is a tactic that had been used on a number of
4 previous occasions where there was a risk of
5 confrontation, you created a diversion by having
6 a meeting in another spot and that was the case here.
7 But the bulk of the crowd would not have been told until
8 we were well down the way.
9 MR TOOHEY: Was that on the footing that the marchers would
10 simply follow the lorry or on some other footing?
11 A. Yes, and the overwhelming majority of people did follow
12 the lorry.
13 MR CLARKE: May we come then, please, to KC12.19,
14 paragraph 35. You describe how the lorry which was
15 ahead of you, very close to the front, turned south and
16 headed for Free Derry Corner. You followed it, but
17 walked only a short distance south along
18 Rossville Street.
19 When the lorry got to the junction, the corner
20 between William Street and Rossville Street, were you
21 close behind it at that stage?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You say you walked only a short distance south along
24 Rossville Street before becoming conscious that a number
25 of young men had detached themselves and were hell bent
1 on having an afternoon's fun and entertainment by
2 throwing stones at the Army at the barrier at the
3 eastern end of William Street.
4 If we go to paragraph 36 on the next page, you
5 describe how you decided to move back into
6 William Street to help the stewards who were desperately
7 urging people to head for the meeting which was to take
8 place at Free Derry Corner and you ended up around the
9 junction of William Street and Chamberlain Street.
10 Could we have on the screen photograph P353. This
11 is a photograph that was taken on the day. We can see,
12 just, that the lorry by this stage -- the rear of the
13 lorry is here with the civil rights banner and the cab
14 is I think somewhere over here. The lorry has by now
15 turned south down Rossville Street and we can see, in
16 the foreground of the photograph, that there were
17 a number of youths who have peeled off down
18 William Street.
19 As I understand it, at this stage you would have
20 been pretty close behind the lorry, about there; is that
21 right? (Indicating)
22 A. Yes. There were two types of people who did not follow
23 the lorry. First of all, there were young men who
24 wanted to have a go and throw stones, but, secondly,
25 there were people who, out of curiosity had heard that
1 the Paras were in William Street, which of course they
2 were not at that stage, and they wanted to have a look
3 at them.
4 So, for example, the man with the cap in the front,
5 I would put into that type of category and a number of
6 other people who were making their way down would have
7 been in the same category.
8 Q. May we come, please, to KC12.20, paragraphs 37 to the
9 end. You describe how you could see young fellas
10 grabbing stones from the wasteground around
11 William Street and throwing them at soldiers behind the
12 barrier. You yourself went right down next to the
13 barrier to take a close look at what was happening, and
14 you say that there were soldiers who looked to you hyped
15 up:
16 "... there was a drunken pest [who insisted that
17 you] should take the march through the barrier [and]
18 'liberate the Guildhall'."
19 You describe in paragraph 38 how you strongly
20 disapproved of the confrontation and quickly retreated
21 and ran west up William Street, which was full of
22 people, on your way to Free Derry Corner and, as you
23 left the riot scene, you could hear rubber bullets being
24 fired and were conscious of CS gas flying around behind
25 you. You say:
1 "I also saw a water cannon brought up to the barrier
2 as I was leaving the scene."
3 Were you ever present when the water cannon was
4 actually used?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Then you describe, in paragraph 39, how older people
7 standing on William Street were criticising the young
8 for rioting. You passed the junction with
9 Rossville Street where there were still stewards
10 attempting to control the crowd, but now even more
11 depleted in number and there were people running with
12 you as you made your way towards Free Derry Corner.
13 Did you make your way to Free Derry Corner along
14 Rossville Street past the block of the Rossville Flats
15 that runs parallel to Rossville Street?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. At the time when you did that, was Rossville Street
18 itself still full of people or was it thinning out, or
19 do you not recall?
20 A. I do recall, because my concern at that stage was to get
21 the meeting started and that would have meant that
22 people who were still hanging around the mouth of
23 Rossville Street would make their way over to hear the
24 speeches. Our difficulty was the meeting had not
25 started and that -- I felt that if the meeting was
1 started that more people would gather round the
2 platform. But there were quite a few people standing
3 around Rossville Street.
4 Q. You describe in paragraph 40 how, when you reached Free
5 Derry Corner, there was a large crowd gathered round the
6 lorry in a wide arc. At the top of the next page you
7 describe being helped up on to the platform,
8 Lord Brockway was already there. You say that as you
9 stood on the platform you saw two or three APCs
10 positioned at the junction of William Street and
11 Rossville Street facing south and they were not moving.
12 You then describe how, when you were in the process
13 of speaking, you heard a number of distinctive cracks.
14 How confident are you that as you stood on the
15 platform before you had started to speak you saw two or
16 three stationary APCs at the junction of William Street
17 and Rossville Street?
18 A. I am confident.
19 Q. I want to show you a photograph which was taken on the
20 day. Can we have a look at EP23.5. The reason that
21 I ask, is this: we know from a large amount of evidence
22 that Support Company of the Paras came through the
23 barrier in Little James Street and crossed the junction
24 between Little James Street and William Street and that
25 the two leading Pigs, APCs, turned off to their left,
1 that is to say to the east towards the back of the
2 Chamberlain Street houses and one Pig ended up facing
3 the back of the Chamberlain Street houses, to the north
4 of the wasteground and one came into the mouth of the
5 car park and the remainder of them drove in and
6 initially came to a halt.
7 This photograph, which is heavily foreshortened,
8 shows the position when they came to a halt. So that
9 one can get one's bearings: William Street is there;
10 Little James Street is there and Sackville Street is off
11 there. (Indicating) The vehicles all look bunched
12 together, but they are in fact further apart than the
13 photograph appears to show, but there came a stage when
14 there was a command vehicle stationary --
15 A. Which street they are on now?
16 Q. This is Rossville Street; do you follow? There was
17 a command vehicle I am pointing out in red. There was
18 a little scout car to the left. There were probably two
19 Pigs behind, though one can only with ease see one.
20 Then there were two lorries and then there were two
21 further figures coming up the rear with the
22 northern-most Pig, this one that I am pointing out in
23 blue, practically at the junction between
24 Rossville Street and William Street.
25 Putting it shortly, we know that initially all these
1 vehicles drove down; two bore off to the right of this
2 photograph as you look at it and the convoy stopped in
3 the position that we see in the photograph.
4 Do you remember ever seeing either a convoy like
5 this or possibly simply the leading two vehicles of the
6 convoy stationary in Rossville Street?
7 A. (Pause). At the mouth of Rossville Street?
8 Q. No, not in fact. Could we have EP23.5 on the left-hand
9 side and could we have the map, KC12.64 on the
10 right-hand side. Could we highlight the middle section
11 of the map. What happened is this: vehicles came down
12 Rossville Street. One turned off and, in the end, ended
13 up facing approximately in the direction that I have put
14 with the blue arrow. One came to the mouth of the car
15 park and ended up in approximately the position of the
16 green arrow and the other vehicles were in line from the
17 junction with William Street down to approximately
18 there, where my yellow arrow now is on the screen; do
19 you follow?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. So that the vehicles we can see in the photograph on the
22 left were on the ground, broadly speaking in the line
23 described by my yellow arrow from William Street down to
24 a position mid-way with Kells Walk.
25 Do you recollect seeing either the first two or
1 a whole convoy of vehicles stationary in that position?
2 A. I do not recollect seeing the convoy.
3 Q. You were, of course, quite some way away?
4 A. I was at --
5 Q. Down at Free Derry Corner?
6 A. -- Free Derry Corner.
7 Q. Is it possible that what you saw is the first two
8 vehicles of the convoy?
9 A. It is possible. You have to remember I was on the
10 platform which was elevated and, therefore, I could see
11 further than I would do if I was on the ground.
12 Q. May we come back, please, to KC12.21, paragraphs 42 and
13 43. You say that you believe that you were in the
14 process of speaking with Bernadette Devlin to your right
15 and Lord Brockway further to your right when you heard
16 a number of distinctive cracks. Your immediate reaction
17 was that rubber bullets were being fired towards FDC and
18 you think someone to your left said that rubber bullets
19 were being fired and you did not think at this stage
20 that these were lead bullets.
21 A small point, nothing much turns on it, but you say
22 that you believe that you were in the process of
23 speaking. The Tribunal has heard evidence from
24 Bernadette Devlin and others that shooting began to be
25 perceived by those who were at the lorry when she was
1 beginning to speak; is that possible?
2 A. It is possible. I have apologised for the
3 non-attendance of the Reverend Terence McCaughey and
4 Bernadette Devlin was the next speaker.
5 Q. I see, in a sense you may both be right?
6 A. So my contribution was very, very brief at that stage.
7 Q. She said that the firing came very soon after she began
8 to speak, so there is not much difference there.
9 You say in paragraph 43 that you became conscious of
10 something "skipping" along the ground, like stones
11 skipping across water, in an area approximately between
12 points C and D, and you say there were at least ten
13 separate instances, no noise created by the actual
14 skipping, and Bernadette said to you "that is lead,
15 'Coops'".
16 Could we have a look back at the map at KC12.64.
17 You have referred to points C and D as the area between
18 which you perceived this skipping to take place. Did
19 you actually see anything which appeared to be the
20 strike of something on the ground, or not?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You did?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You then describe, if we can go back to paragraph 43 at
25 KC12.21, how it dawned on you that the skipping was
1 being caused by live gunfire and that lead was buzzing
2 around you.
3 You were familiar, were you, with the sound of live
4 gunfire?
5 A. I have heard -- I had heard live gunfire prior to that.
6 Q. Is it possible that you were right and that what in fact
7 was happening was the sound of rubber bullets?
8 A. In what -- what context are you asking me?
9 Q. What you are describing in paragraph 43 is being
10 conscious of skipping?
11 A. Uh-huh.
12 Q. In the area that you have indicated?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Bernadette Devlin then says "that is lead"; you then
15 say:
16 "It then dawned on me that the skipping was being
17 caused by live gunfire and that lead was buzzing around
18 me."
19 What I was raising with you was whether it was
20 possible that it was not in fact lead, even though
21 Bernadette said that it was, and that what in fact you
22 may have heard was the sound of rubber bullets?
23 A. There were a lot of people around there at that
24 particular time. If you were familiar with civil rights
25 marches in those days, once rubber bullets were fired,
1 there was a scramble to collect them. In other words,
2 with a large number of people that were there, they
3 undoubtedly would have been retrieving the rubber
4 bullets and that was not the case.
5 Q. You then describe how the people facing the platform
6 were scattering and scurrying around?
7 A. It was absolute panic.
8 Q. They moved towards Lisfannon Park and the Old Bog Road
9 and you had, with some difficulty, understandably, to
10 get Lord Brockway off the coal lorry.
11 May we come, please, to paragraphs 44 and 45. You
12 describe being pinned to the ground in front of the
13 platform where there was now a large open space in front
14 of you as people had moved away and you became more
15 conscious of bullets -- maybe 20 to 25 -- flying around.
16 You say that some bullets seemed to be hitting something
17 above you. Do you know what it was that they appeared
18 to be hitting?
19 A. I do not know.
20 Q. May it have been the wall behind the --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- the lorry?
23 A. Yes, that is possible.
24 Q. You say:
25 "They appeared to me to be flying from straight in
1 front of me (north to the south)."
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And that you were convinced at the time that the shots
4 were being fired from the city wall, but you are not
5 clear why you reached that conclusion. Could we have
6 back on the screen KC12.64. If they were coming from
7 north to south, how is it that you took the view that
8 they were coming from the city wall which, if anything,
9 is to the east?
10 A. It was an impression I had. I have, I have said in my
11 statement that I, I do not know how I reached that
12 conclusion, but that was the feeling that I had; that
13 there was gunfire from both in front of me and also from
14 the city walls.
15 Q. You thought it was from both directions?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. We know that when the two APCs that I have been speaking
18 about stopped, the one facing towards the back of the
19 Chamberlain Street houses and the one facing into the
20 car park, a number of soldiers got out of them and that
21 both rubber bullets and then live bullets were fired,
22 including a number of bullets -- a sizeable number of
23 bullets fired within the car park of the
24 Rossville Flats, either in that direction or that
25 direction or the like.
1 Is it possible that what you heard from Free Derry
2 Corner was in fact the firing of live bullets within the
3 car park of the Rossville Flats?
4 A. Yes, that is a possibility.
5 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 45 at KC12.21. You
6 describe feeling very exposed on the ground in front of
7 the platform and many people were calling and shouting
8 to you from the southern side of the flats. So you
9 began crawling towards the telephone box at the south
10 end of Block 1, looking north along Rossville Street.
11 Could we have back on the screen KC12.64. That
12 means that you were crawling from here broadly speaking
13 in that direction; is that right? (Indicating)
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you know why it was that you crawled in that
16 direction rather than, for instance, taking cover behind
17 Joseph Place to the east or in Lisfannon Park to the
18 west?
19 A. Because people were calling to me from near the
20 telephone box. In addition, I very stupidly had not
21 appreciated the real danger that existed at that time.
22 Q. Can we come, please, to paragraphs 46 and 47 on KC12.22.
23 You describe there how you could see three or four APCs,
24 all moving south along Rossville Street and about 12
25 soldiers at the north end of Rossville Street near
1 Kells Walk and two or three of them in the open to the
2 east of Kells Walk, were on one knee, appearing to be
3 taking aim and firing at selected targets and you could
4 see jerks of their rifles as they fired shots. Did you
5 see any flashes?
6 A. No.
7 Q. You say that those two or three soldiers were ahead of
8 the rest of the soldiers, seemed to fire shots to their
9 left and to their right, moving their rifles around in
10 a covering arc and circulating their body and you think
11 that they then stood up, moved forward and fired from
12 the waist and began to move stealthily -- the soldiers
13 behind them then moved along Rossville Street and tock
14 up positions near Kells Walk and stood with their rifle
15 to the shoulder and seemed to you to be shooting from
16 the shoulder towards the rubble barricade.
17 I would like you to help us, if you can, about where
18 you think that you saw these two sets of soldiers.
19 Could we have on the screen photograph P204. This is
20 a photograph which shows the position of
21 Rossville Street from Free Derry Corner at the bottom to
22 the north of the Rossville Street Flats. Can we have
23 that on the left-hand side of the screen and can we have
24 on the right-hand side of the screen P209. This is
25 a photograph taken from the opposite angle.
1 Would you find one or other of those photographs
2 more easy to deal with than the other?
3 A. I think probably this one to my right --
4 Q. The one on the right?
5 A. I think so.
6 Q. Could we have P209, please, full screen. Would you be
7 able to indicate on this photograph where you saw two or
8 three soldiers to the east of Kells Walk on one knee
9 apparently picking people off?
10 A. I am sorry, Mr Clarke, when you say "to the east," those
11 terms do not help me.
12 Q. I am sorry, the east is this side, the right-hand side
13 of the photograph?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. In paragraph 46 of your statement you talk about seeing
16 two or three soldiers on one knee to the east of
17 Kells Walk. No doubt the person who took the statement
18 used "east" to mean on the right-hand side of this
19 photograph as we look at it?
20 A. Where, where the arrow is is not the place where I would
21 have seen them.
22 Q. No, that was simply to indicate which side of the
23 photograph is east?
24 A. I am sorry. Right.
25 Q. I wonder whether you would be able to indicate on this
1 photograph, by marking it, if we give you control of the
2 photograph, where it was that you saw the soldiers on
3 one knee close to Kells Walk?
4 A. Where is Kells Walk, here?
5 Q. That building is Kells Walk.
6 A. In this vicinity here, not to the east. (Marked with
7 yellow arrow - KC12.122)
8 Q. Where the tip of your yellow arrow; is that right?
9 A. Yes, well, perhaps just marginally further back.
10 Q. When you say, "marginally further back," back in which
11 direction?
12 A. In the direction of William Street.
13 Q. Could somebody take off the blue arrow, please. I think
14 we can leave the yellow arrow, but with the caveat that
15 it may have been slightly further towards
16 William Street.
17 The place that you have indicated is, as we can see,
18 out in the open?
19 A. They were not taking cover. When the soldiers first
20 came in -- when the Paras first came in, they were not
21 taking cover.
22 Q. You describe how the soldiers whom you first saw on one
23 knee then moved forward south along Rossville Street and
24 the soldiers behind them moved south and took up
25 positions near Kells Walk.
1 Do you recollect where the soldiers who had been
2 firing on one knee moved to?
3 A. They went out of my vision, so I am not quite sure where
4 they would have gone, whether it was behind Kells Walk
5 or where they went to, but they went out of my vision.
6 Q. What about the soldiers who had been behind them who
7 moved and stood with their rifle up to their shoulders;
8 do you recall where they went to?
9 A. Well, they -- some of them were, some of them were --
10 moved towards the area where the rubber -- where the
11 rubble barrier was; they were moving down in that
12 direction, but they were out in the open.
13 Q. Are you able to be any more precise as to where you saw
14 those soldiers who fired from the shoulder take up
15 a position?
16 A. No, they -- the soldiers who fired from, from where?
17 What are you asking me?
18 Q. The soldiers who fired from the shoulder?
19 A. I think they took up position on both sides.
20 Q. On both sides of?
21 A. Rossville Street.
22 Q. In the open?
23 A. Some of them took -- some of them went in behind these
24 walls that are round Kells Walk and further on down
25 Glenfada Park.
1 Q. I want to show you some photographs that were taken on
2 the day to see if they bring back any recollection of
3 what you saw. Can we have on the screen EP23.6. This
4 is a photograph that was taken from the side of
5 Rossville Street, the side that was on the right-hand
6 side of the photograph that we were looking at a moment
7 ago. This is the Kells Walk building?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. There is a little wall to the south of it and there is
10 the pram ramp that leads up to it. It is just possible
11 to see in this photograph a soldier running. This is
12 one of a series of photographs.
13 Can we have a look at EP23.7. A little later,
14 a soldier has taken a position at the corner of the pram
15 ramp and one in the corner constituted by the pram ramp
16 and the wall to the south of Kells Walk.
17 EP23.8. By this time a number of other soldiers
18 have come forward into the corner and other soldiers are
19 coming down parallel to Kells Walk.
20 EP23.9. In the next photograph, the soldiers who
21 came into the corner have left it and are going round
22 and some of them are taking up positions at this wall
23 and behind them there are more soldiers who appear to be
24 coming down and some are at the top of the street.
25 Do those photographs bring back any recollection of
1 what you may have seen on the day?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. That rings a bell, does it?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Could we have on the screen EP27.6. This is another
6 photograph that was taken on the day. This is the
7 rubble barricade; this is Block 1 of the
8 Rossville Flats; this is the gable end of Glenfada Park
9 and at the time when this photograph was taken, the Army
10 vehicles that we saw in an earlier photograph, including
11 the command vehicle with the Perspex top and the scout
12 car, are further to the north of the photograph and
13 there is a large expanse of street in which there is
14 nothing between the leading vehicle and the barricade
15 and behind the barricade in this photograph there are 30
16 or 40 people and there were no doubt more towards the
17 Rossville flats.
18 Do you recollect seeing a scene like this, that is
19 to say the barricade with, behind it, 40 or more people
20 standing around?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You do? You saw that from the platform? Did you see
23 what happened to those people?
24 A. No. I am, I am not sure I saw that scene from the
25 platform because I believe that I was off the platform
1 at that stage.
2 Q. Do you think you saw it when you were --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- on the ground and crawling?
5 A. Yes, yes.
6 Q. May we come then, please, to paragraphs 47 to the end on
7 KC12.22. You say in paragraph 47 that you did not see
8 any person shot, nor did you see anyone fall, but when
9 you took a second look north along Rossville Street:
10 "... there were people around the barricade who
11 appeared to me to be injured."
12 When you saw people who appeared to you to be
13 injured, were they standing or fallen or --
14 A. Fallen.
15 Q. What caused you to think that they were injured?
16 A. There were some people around them and, also, it
17 appeared that people were carrying others away.
18 Q. At this stage you saw some people still standing, did
19 you?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You describe in paragraph 8 how firing was heavy as you
22 continued to crawl from the lorry towards the telephone
23 box and bullets were spitting around you. When you say
24 that, do you mean that you perceived the strike of
25 bullets near you or simply that you heard the sound of
1 bullets?
2 A. I perceived the strike.
3 Q. You say you felt the soldiers were taking aim at you as
4 you were crawling. Was there anybody near you when you
5 were crawling?
6 A. Yes, there were three or four others.
7 Q. You say that soldiers standing on the west side of
8 Rossville Street in the approximate area of grid
9 reference K13 appeared to be firing shots in the
10 direction of the barricade and in your general
11 direction.
12 Could we have back on the screen the photograph that
13 we saved a little earlier. It was going to have been
14 KC12.122, but it will not have that number yet. That
15 does not seem to have the --
16 MR HOYT: I do not think it was saved.
17 MR CLARKE: That is not the saved version; have we lost the
18 saved version?
19 LORD SAVILLE: I am not sure we actually ever saved it,
20 Mr Clarke.
21 MR CLARKE: Did we not? Let me mark it again, then. That,
22 I think, was where you marked as the approximate
23 position where you had seen the soldiers on one knee; is
24 that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Can we save that as KC12.122. Can you tell us where it
2 was that you saw soldiers who appeared to be firing in
3 your direction and at the barricade when you crawled
4 from Free Derry Corner towards Block 1 of the
5 Rossville Flats?
6 A. Further down.
7 Q. Do you know whereabouts?
8 A. Further down Rossville Street.
9 Q. Was that in line with Glenfada Park or the pram ramps
10 between Glenfada Park and Kells Walk or, where?
11 A. The pram ramps.
12 Q. Would you be able to indicate on this, in a colour other
13 than yellow, where approximately those soldiers were?
14 A. I cannot from this map. I saw soldiers on the pram
15 ramps.
16 Q. When you say, as you do in paragraph 48 of your
17 statement, that soldiers standing on the west side of
18 Rossville Street, south of Kells Walk appeared to you to
19 be firing shots in the direction of the rubble barricade
20 and in your general direction --
21 A. The west is the part of Rossville Street which is
22 adjacent to Kells Walk; is that not the case?
23 Q. It is, yes. What I was asking is whether by reference
24 to what will become KC12.122, you were able to indicate
25 where you thought those soldiers were, who you thought
1 were taking aim at you?
2 A. Can we go back at the --
3 Q. Yes, please, can we have the ...?
4 A. I thought they were more here, this area. Somewhere in
5 that area. (Marked with blue arrow - KC12.122)
6 Q. Can we preserve KC12.122 in that form, with the blue
7 arrow showing the area in question.
8 May we come then back, please, to KC12.22,
9 paragraphs 48 to the end. You describe how, as you
10 crawled, you could see the telephone box at the south
11 end of Block 1; that you had to stop several times; that
12 when you thought it was safe you half ran in a crouched
13 position and the shooting continued and you had several
14 glances at the rubble barricade. You describe noticing
15 there was a person lying on the ground to the south of
16 the barricade, on the western side, close to the
17 barricade who appeared to be injured.
18 When you say "on the western side," you mean, do
19 you, towards the Glenfada Park North side of the
20 barricade?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. There were about five people standing around the person
23 lying on the ground?
24 A. Well, they seemed to be attending to him.
25 Q. So you see this group of people at the barricade. Are
1 you conscious of seeing any other people at the
2 barricade, apart from the person who was lying on the
3 ground --
4 A. There were others.
5 Q. Were they standing or lying?
6 A. They were lying.
7 Q. Over the page, if we may, down to paragraph 54. You say
8 you saw one or two people run from the east of
9 Rossville Street to the west and into
10 Glenfada Park North and as you reached the point that
11 you have marked at E to the west of Joseph Place you
12 heard a shout, looked up and saw Barney McGuigan facing
13 you, standing at the south of Block 1, near the
14 telephone box, in a half crouched position. You say
15 that you think he shouted to you something like "they
16 have fucking shot the man"; is that the shout which
17 caused you to look up?
18 A. I do not recollect.
19 Q. You say that you continued to lie down to the ground and
20 crawl. You describe in paragraph 54 how Barney McGuigan
21 was in a state of panic, clearly concerned for the
22 person who he knew had been shot. May we come then to
23 paragraphs 55 and 56. You say that as you continued to
24 crawl, he started to move in a standing but crouched
25 position, not like Father Daly in the well-known
1 photograph, but waving more like a half-hearted wave and
2 started to walk west across your line of vision, about
3 30 feet away from you, with a cloth in his hand, which
4 he was waving in a half-hearted manner, which did not
5 seem to have any positive meaning, in the general
6 direction of the north end of Rossville Street.
7 You say he had only taken a few steps and as he came
8 out into the open, you think you heard the same cracking
9 noise as you had heard earlier and he just folded up,
10 crumpled. He fell down on his side, falling towards the
11 wall at the south end of Block 1.
12 When you saw that happen, were you conscious or able
13 to tell where the shot that caused him to fold up had
14 come from?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Were you conscious of seeing any soldiers at this stage
17 in or around Rossville Street, Glenfada or Kells Walk?
18 A. Yes, I did.
19 Q. Were you able to connect any of those soldiers whom you
20 saw with the shooting of Barney McGuigan?
21 A. No. Can I just make a small point, it is a very small
22 point: looking at my statement where I say he was about
23 30 feet away, I think that is, is incorrect, I think it
24 would be more likely to be 50, 60 feet away.
25 Q. May we have a photograph only for the witness and the
1 lawyers on the screen now, photograph P728. This is
2 a photograph that was taken on the day. It shows
3 Barney McGuigan fallen and lying in a pool of blood. Is
4 that how you saw him after he had fallen?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. We can see in this photograph that there is a boy, whom
7 we know to have been Hugh Gilmore, lying just at the
8 corner of Block 1 of the Rossville Flats. Were you
9 conscious of seeing him on the day?
10 A. That is the surprising thing; I was not.
11 Q. We can also see at the time when this photograph was
12 taken, a series of people huddled in the lee of the
13 telephone box. Were you conscious of a number of people
14 against the gable wall of Block 1?
15 A. A very large number of people. That, that is only
16 a small snippet of the number of people.
17 Q. We can also see in this photograph -- could we lighten
18 it up a little -- if you look very closely, that there
19 is an Army vehicle whose nose is approximately level
20 with the gable end of Glenfada Park and which we know is
21 a vehicle that came forward to pick up the bodies of
22 three of those who died at the barricade.
23 Do you remember seeing or being conscious of the
24 presence of an Army vehicle?
25 A. No.
1 Q. In that area?
2 A. No.
3 Q. May we come, please, to paragraph 57 at KC12.23. You
4 told us a moment ago that at the time when you saw
5 Barney being shot you were probably something like
6 50 yards [sic] away. After you had seen him shot, did
7 you continue crawling towards the south of Block 1 or
8 did you get up and run or did you stop; what did you do?
9 A. I went to beside Barney McGuigan.
10 Q. Did you crawl towards him or did you --
11 A. I think I ran towards him.
12 Q. And this was immediately after he had been shot; is that
13 right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. You describe hearing a woman screaming in a high-pitched
16 tone, the melee. You said here:
17 "I continued to crawl towards his body," but you
18 think you may have run towards the end; is that right?
19 A. I think I ran towards the end, yes.
20 Q. And you knew that he had been fatally wounded. Can we
21 come over the page, please, to KC12.24, down to
22 paragraph 60. You say that something was put over his
23 body by a middle-aged woman which covered a part of his
24 head but left part still visible. You say:
25 "I do not know where the cloth went" which you
1 believe Barney had in his hand. Do you know what it was
2 that the middle-aged woman put on over part of his head?
3 A. No.
4 Q. I want to show you another photograph. Could we have on
5 the screen P731. We know that at some stage -- and this
6 photograph shows -- a scarf, you can just see it in the
7 photograph, was put over Barney's head and later we can
8 see this man putting a blanket over him.
9 Do you remember seeing a scarf put over him?
10 A. I do not know what it was that was on his head. I do
11 not recollect that it was a scarf.
12 MR TOOHEY: Mr Clarke, it is just a small point perhaps, you
13 referred, I think to 50 yards. I think in each case the
14 reference was initially to 30 feet and then perhaps more
15 likely to be, Mr Cooper said, 50 or 60 feet.
16 MR CLARKE: I am sorry. That is right, is it, we are
17 talking in --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Thank you very much. May we come back to KC12.24, down
20 to paragraph 62. You say in paragraph 60 that as you
21 stood near Barney's body you became aware of something
22 going on on the other side, that is to say the west
23 side, of Rossville Street and conscious of activity in
24 Glenfada Park North. You say that people were being
25 carried from the area around the rubble barricade into
1 Glenfada Park, either one man or two men were being
2 carried by other men from the rubble barricade into
3 Glenfada Park North.
4 How sure are you of the sequence of events, that is
5 to say that you saw one or two men being removed from
6 the rubble barricade after you had seen Barney McGuigan
7 shot?
8 A. I am not sure of the chronology.
9 Q. When you say in paragraph 60 that you became conscious
10 of activity in Glenfada Park North, is that simply that
11 you became aware that somebody was being carried into
12 Glenfada Park North or was there some other sort of
13 activity of which you became conscious?
14 A. I became conscious of someone being carried in.
15 Q. Could you tell what was happening in Glenfada Park?
16 A. Panic. People were hysterical. I have never
17 encountered fear like it in my life, total, complete
18 panic. People were in shock. A large number of people
19 were so seriously in shock that when they spoke to you,
20 they clung to you.
21 Q. At this stage you were on the other side of
22 Rossville Street, were you not?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Near Barney's body?
25 A. Yes, but I am talking about when I went into
1 Glenfada Park.
2 Q. You describe in paragraph 61 looking again towards the
3 north of Rossville Street and seeing two soldiers on the
4 pram-way by Kells Walk on the first tier, with a rifle
5 pointed towards the rubble barricade. You did not ever
6 see, did you, either of those soldiers fire?
7 A. No.
8 Q. May we come --
9 A. They were there for quite a while.
10 Q. But just having their rifles pointed and not doing
11 anything else?
12 A. I did not see them firing.
13 Q. May we come from paragraph 62 to the end, please. You
14 then describe recalling being at the north of
15 Glenfada Park North and there were people being carried
16 around Glenfada Park North, people on the west side,
17 people were walking around with blood on their clothes
18 and "people crammed like pigs behind the wooden fencing
19 in Glenfada Park".
20 You must obviously have crossed from the south of
21 Block 1 of Rossville Flats to get into Glenfada Park and
22 you have a recollection of being at the north end of
23 Glenfada Park. Do you know what you did; did you just
24 walk across Rossville Street to the south of the rubble
25 barricade into Glenfada Park?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Do you recollect what you saw at the barricade when you
3 crossed?
4 A. No.
5 Q. The Tribunal has had a lot of evidence that at some
6 stage soldiers came into Glenfada Park and rounded up
7 people who had been huddling at the gable end. Do you
8 remember any soldiers coming into Glenfada Park?
9 A. I think that I arrived in Glenfada Park after that had
10 occurred.
11 Q. Could we have on the screen EP23 --
12 A. I am not certain of that, but I think so.
13 Q. Could we have on the screen EP23.10. This is
14 a photograph that was taken on the day, probably earlier
15 than the time that you were in Glenfada Park and quite
16 possibly earlier than the time when you saw -- indeed
17 probably earlier than the time when you saw
18 Barney McGuigan shot.
19 We know that what it in fact shows is a group of
20 people round what we now know to have been the body of
21 Michael Kelly, one of those who was shot at the
22 barricade and who was taken into Glenfada Park. This is
23 a photograph that was taken before any soldiers came in.
24 Do you have any recollection of seeing any scene
25 like that?
1 A. There were a number of scenes like that on the day.
2 That particular one, I do not.
3 Q. Could we have EP23.11. That is another photograph in
4 the same sequence. In EP23.12, there is a photograph
5 which includes in it Father Bradley and Father O'Keefe
6 and some alarmed looking individuals.
7 Do you have any recollection of seeing individuals
8 in this position, that is to say at this gable end?
9 A. I do not have a recollection of seeing that particular
10 sequence, but I do have a recollection of seeing people
11 at that gable end and I, I do not recollect seeing
12 either Father Bradley or Terry O'Keefe on the day.
13 Q. When you saw people at that gable end, was that after
14 you had seen Barney McGuigan shot?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And when you went over into Glenfada Park?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. May we then come, please, back to KC12.24, paragraph 63
19 to the end. You say in paragraph 64 that when you were
20 in Glenfada Park you noticed a person lying on the
21 ground at the approximate point that you have marked M
22 who appeared to be fatally injured and who was covered
23 by a coat and you could still hear shooting at the time
24 and people in Glenfada Park were shouting at you and
25 told you that there was a telephone call for you in
1 flat 7.
2 Before we get to the events in that flat, I want to
3 show you two photographs that were taken on the day.
4 Could we have on the screen P680. This is a photograph
5 looking into Glenfada Park. In order to orientate
6 yourself, Rossville Street is off over to the left of
7 this photograph. This photograph is taken from
8 Columbcille Court looking inwards and in a southerly,
9 that is to say towards Free Derry Corner direction. It
10 shows on it three bodies. You can just pick out the
11 legs of a body lying face down, which is that of
12 James Wray and there are two bodies, one on the pavement
13 and one in the gutter, in the middle of the photograph
14 which we know to have been the bodies of
15 William McKinney, who was killed, and Joe Mahon, who was
16 shot in the leg.
17 Do you have any recollection of seeing bodies in
18 approximately the position shown in that photograph?
19 A. This photograph was apparently taken before I arrived on
20 the scene, so when I arrived there were people round
21 bodies in this approximate area, but I did not know --
22 at that stage I did not know if these people had been
23 shot -- had been fatally wounded, I just did not know.
24 Q. Could we go back to KC12.24. You describe in
25 paragraph 64 how before you went to take the telephone
1 call in flat 7, you noticed somebody on the ground at
2 the approximate position marked M. The approximate
3 position marked M is approximately where James Wray's
4 body is shown on the photograph. Then subsequently you
5 go on to say that when you came out of the flat you
6 noticed three people in Glenfada Park North, lying dead
7 or injured.
8 Is it possible that you only saw the three people,
9 including the body at point M, after you had taken the
10 telephone call from flat 7?
11 A. It is possible.
12 Q. It would seem unlikely --
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. -- that you could have missed the other two; would it
15 not?
16 A. There were things happened that day to me which I cannot
17 explain. For example, near where Barney McGuigan had
18 lost his life, I do not have any recollection of other
19 bodies being there.
20 Q. May we come over the page to paragraphs 66 to 68. You
21 describe the telephone conversation in the flat. The
22 person making the call asked "Ivan, have there been
23 people killed?" You said "yes" he said "the deal is
24 off, we are coming in" and you recognised him as one of
25 the four members of the IRA who you had met earlier.
1 Was the person who spoke to you the OC or somebody
2 else?
3 A. Yes. I have not mentioned in my statement, but at one
4 stage I saw Jim Wray sitting on the ground near the
5 rubble barricade.
6 Q. There is a photograph of him doing that.
7 A. Yes, well, I saw, I saw that particular event.
8 Q. Could we have on the screen KC112.118. Can I explain
9 what this is. This is an extract from some manuscript
10 notes made by Dr Neil O'Doherty, who is the author of
11 the book "From Civil Rights to Armalites," of an
12 interview with you. Much of it is not directly relevant
13 to the Inquiry, but there is a passage at the bottom
14 which relates to Bloody Sunday. If we go to KC12.121,
15 with the assistance of Dr O'Doherty, there has been
16 prepared a typed copy of what his notes read. You have,
17 I believe, Mr Cooper, an unredacted, that is to say an
18 unblanked-out copy both of the manuscript and the
19 typescript?
20 A. I saw one ten minutes before I came here.
21 Q. There is only a small passage that I want to ask you
22 about. The notes read:
23 "BS" and then a name has been redacted, which is the
24 name you confirmed of the person described as the OC
25 "made a deal with" -- that is to indicate that the word
1 appears as shorthand "with him to stay in Creggan.
2 After 5 dead called him up. Said the ... deal was off."
3 That is a reference, I assume -- can you confirm --
4 to the telephone conversation that took place in number
5 7 Glenfada Park?
6 A. Yes, but I was not certain at that time how many were
7 dead.
8 Q. But there were plainly some who were dead?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. In consequence of that the deal was called off. There
11 is a reference in the original manuscript, which may or
12 may not relate to Bloody Sunday, which reads "some were
13 in it up to the eyeballs"; do you know what that may
14 have been --
15 A. I do not know, but I do not think it referred to
16 Bloody Sunday.
17 Q. There is also in the original manuscript a link to the
18 OC with the words "ousted then." Do you know what that
19 was a reference to?
20 A. I would not have known -- I do not know. I do not know
21 the reasons for that. I do not know when the OC gave up
22 his command.
23 Q. We know from Mr McGuinness that it was pretty soon after
24 Bloody Sunday. Did you understand that he had been
25 ousted?
1 A. No.
2 Q. There are also a series of names and an abbreviation.
3 One abbreviation, "Mcgs", is an abbreviation of
4 McGuinness "in then" and then a series of names are set
5 out which are redacted.
6 Am I right in thinking that those are names of
7 people who were in the Provisionals at the time of
8 Bloody Sunday?
9 A. There is one name that I do not -- I cannot recollect,
10 but the rest, the answer is: yes.
11 Q. There are one, two, three, four names in the original.
12 Can you tell me by the number which is the name that you
13 do not recollect?
14 A. I have not got that on the screen.
15 Q. No, you have not, I asked that the unredacted copy
16 should be made available and was told it had been.
17 A. It was shown to me this morning and then the person who
18 showed it to me took it off to give it to counsel.
19 (Handed)
20 Q. Can you tell me which number is unfamiliar to you?
21 A. The second one.
22 Q. The second one. Thank you. Can I have that document
23 back, please. (Handed)
24 By this stage, you had been told that the deal was
25 off, the deal being that the IRA would stay away. Did
1 you learn what had been done after the deal had been
2 called off?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Can we come then, please, back to KC12.25, paragraphs 67
5 to the end. You say that after the telephone
6 conversation you came out of the flat and the shooting
7 seemed to have intensified and as you walked down the
8 ramp from the flat at the northeast end of
9 Glenfada Park North, you could see soldiers around the
10 east of Columbcille Court, poking their heads and
11 pointing their rifles around corners, but the gunfire
12 seemed to be coming from the south end of
13 Glenfada Park North.
14 Could you tell in what direction the shooting
15 appeared to be going at this stage?
16 A. I do not know.
17 Q. Or what type of gunfire it was?
18 A. It appeared to me to be high velocity.
19 Q. You then describe seeing three people at points M, P and
20 Q, which I think we can take it is likely to have been
21 those in the photograph we saw earlier; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You then head south towards Westland Street. Just
24 before we come to that aspect of the day, could we have
25 on the screen KC12.44. Could we highlight the last
1 paragraph. There is a passage which I do not want to
2 misinterpret but I want to ask you about. You were
3 asked about the significance of Bloody Sunday, and your
4 recorded answer was:
5 "In Derry it has a very great significance. I have
6 never forgotten what happened on Bloody Sunday. Those
7 were unarmed people. For a large, for a considerable
8 length of time I could not sleep at night thinking about
9 how I saw those people shot before my very eyes. How
10 I say young Wray, young lad shot down before my very
11 eyes."
12 Then you go on to another topic. On one reading you
13 might have been saying that you actually saw Wray being
14 shot. On another reading you saw him after he had been
15 shot. I want to be clear: did you see Jim Wray actually
16 being shot?
17 A. No.
18 Q. No. Can we come back to KC12.25, paragraphs 69 to the
19 end. You describe heading south towards Westland
20 Street. You think you walked south along the east side
21 of Glenfada Park North and then across
22 Glenfada Park South from the northeast to southwest and
23 have a vague recollection of two people lying on the
24 ground in Glenfada Park South but you do not know
25 whether these people were dead.
1 Did they appear to be injured in some way or is your
2 recollection so vague that you cannot --
3 A. My recollection is so terribly vague, I just do not
4 know.
5 Q. You say you also think there was a Knight of the Order
6 of Malta attending to a person in Glenfada Park South?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Is this a third person in addition to the two people of
9 whom you have a vague recollection?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You then describe running through the front door of
12 John Hume's home. He asks you what was wrong and you
13 told him that there had been murders, deaths and
14 injuries and you ran down the stairs back into the
15 street where there was a car which he told you belonged
16 to Otto Schlindwein with its keys in the ignition and
17 you went off in that car to the hospital?
18 A. John Hume's wife was not at home and she had the only
19 car in the house, so she was not there and, um, that was
20 the only car on the street that had keys in it and we
21 took it.
22 Q. Do you know why it happened to be left there with keys
23 in it?
24 A. I think Derry was a different place in those days, you
25 could leave keys in cars.
1 Q. As you had made your way to John Hume's home, did you
2 ever go to Meenan Square?
3 A. No.
4 Q. May we come then over the page, down to paragraph 73.
5 You describe going to the hospital, silly jibes from the
6 police, seeing Father Tom O'Gara. Then if we can come
7 over the page, KC12.27, at paragraph 80 and following,
8 you describe how somebody told you that a senior had
9 arrived carrying dead bodies. You went to the rear and
10 saw the soldiers taking the dead out of the back of the
11 Saracen and carrying them by their arms and legs and you
12 describe, in this and the subsequent paragraphs, how
13 they were taken into the hospital and put back into the
14 Saracen and taken, you assumed, to the mortuary.
15 I do not want to go into this in any detail not
16 because it is not important, but because your statement
17 is very clear about it.
18 Then if we may come forward to paragraph 88 at
19 KC12.28, after you had been at the hospital you had to
20 return to John Hume's home to give the Taoiseach, as you
21 describe it, a garbled account of the events of the day.
22 If we may come forward to paragraph 91, you say that
23 you have not talked previously about the events of
24 Bloody Sunday and that there remain large blanks in your
25 memory of the events of the day.
1 You made no statement either to NICRA or to
2 Lord Widgery's inquiry; is that right?
3 A. That is right.
4 Q. Was there a reason for that?
5 A. Yes, there was a reason. I looked at Lord Widgery's CV
6 and I saw on his CV his distinguished academic record
7 and his record as a judge, but then I saw in his CV that
8 he was a former Army officer and I made up my mind there
9 and then that he could not conduct an impartial inquiry.
10 Q. But you did not make a statement?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Leaving aside Lord Widgery's inquiry, you did not make
13 a statement to any civil rights organisation?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Can I tell you the reason that I ask. Could we have on
16 the screen L59. This is a contemporary newspaper
17 article and -- it is very difficult to read, I am
18 afraid -- it records or purports to record, we can just
19 pick up your name there, that you had asked for the
20 Derry Central Citizens Defence Committee to open
21 a centre for the taking of statements from eyewitnesses.
22 Is that what you had done?
23 A. No. I am aware that NICRA organised statements,
24 extensive statement-taking, but I was not part of it.
25 Q. It may be that it was John Hume had done that, it is not
1 entirely clear from the passage; do you know whether he
2 had asked for that to be done?
3 A. I very much doubt it.
4 Q. Sorry?
5 A. I very much doubt it, because he shared my concerns
6 about Lord Widgery.
7 Q. May we come, please, to paragraphs 92 and 93 on KC12.29.
8 You express there the view that the soldiers who were
9 positioned on the city wall "hold the key to the day".
10 You say you do not think it was the plan to shoot
11 people, but that you are strongly of the opinion that
12 soldiers on the wall were firing and that that resulted
13 in confusion between the soldiers on the wall and the
14 Paras on the ground and that the military operation
15 simply went wrong.
16 This opinion that the key lies in the soldiers who
17 were positioned on the wall, how long have you held that
18 view?
19 A. I honestly do not know the answer to that. The -- there
20 are aspects of Bloody Sunday where I revise my opinions
21 in relation to several matters, it is an ongoing
22 process.
23 Q. We know that in 1997 there were some Channel 4 News
24 items which recalled some of the evidence that
25 Lord Widgery had and recounted some new evidence about
1 shooting from the walls and I am wondering whether the
2 strong opinion that you express in paragraph 92 is
3 founded on that material or whether it is founded on
4 anything else?
5 A. It is not founded on that material, it is my own
6 conclusion.
7 Q. Thank you. You say in paragraph 93 that you are certain
8 that there were no IRA gunmen in or around the
9 Rossville Flats?
10 A. I was referring to Provisional IRA gunmen.
11 Q. So, let me be clear, this statement should read:
12 "I am certain that there were no Provisional IRA
13 gunmen in or around the Rossville Flats during the march
14 that day."
15 Should I understand from that answer that you are
16 not certain about the position so far as the Officials
17 are concerned?
18 A. Well, I, I have read press reports and I am aware that,
19 that there were people in the Rossville Street general
20 area who had weapons; there is a well-publicised
21 photograph, but as regards the Provisional IRA, I am
22 satisfied that there were no Provisional IRA gunmen in
23 the Rossville Flats or Rossville Street area.
24 Q. You say:
25 "It was always possible prior to and after
1 Bloody Sunday to see IRA gunmen in the Rossville Flats."
2 You had seen them yourself, had you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Had you seen them fire from the flats?
5 A. No.
6 Q. But you had seen men with guns?
7 A. On other occasions, yes.
8 Q. What were they doing when you saw them?
9 A. What were they --
10 Q. Doing?
11 A. When I saw the gunmen?
12 Q. Yes?
13 A. Going into the flats with guns.
14 Q. Do you know what sort of guns?
15 A. No.
16 Q. You say:
17 "As far as I am aware there was no gunfire directed
18 from the Rossville Flats on Bloody Sunday."
19 You say:
20 "I was conscious after I had received the telephone
21 call in Mrs McLenaghan's flat that, as I made my way to
22 John Hume's house on Westland Street, there was
23 a different type of shooting which was softer than the
24 shooting which I had heard prior to receiving the
25 call ..."
1 Could you tell what type of weapon that shooting was
2 coming from?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Did it appear to you to be different from the shooting
5 that the Army had been engaged in?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can we come, please, to paragraph 95. You say that.
8 "The level of IRA activity in Derry prior to
9 Bloody Sunday had, in any case, not been particularly
10 impressive and the IRA had not gained the support of the
11 general public."
12 Lord Widgery had evidence from Brigadier MacLellan,
13 which he has confirmed to this Tribunal must have come
14 from official figures given to him, that between 14th
15 and 30th January, that is to say the fortnight before
16 Bloody Sunday, there were 80 confirmed shooting
17 incidents; 319 rounds fired at soldiers; 84 nail bombs
18 thrown and two members of the Security Forces killed and
19 two wounded.
20 I reel off those figures to you because, if they are
21 anything like right, it would seem to suggest that there
22 was quite a build-up of incidents in the fortnight
23 immediately preceding Bloody Sunday?
24 A. I have seen these figures before and I am aware that two
25 members of the Security Forces lost their lives. I have
1 no knowledge as to the accuracy of the figures, but I,
2 I would not, I would not accept very readily statistics
3 produced at that particular time by the Army; I would
4 not necessarily accept that.
5 My recollection was that prior to Bloody Sunday
6 there was very little support in this city for the IRA
7 and any actions which they carried out certainly did not
8 have the endorsement and approval of the general
9 populace.
10 Q. There are two different questions. One is whether there
11 was approval or endorsement of the IRA, which is one
12 thing. The second is whether approved of or not, there
13 was an increase in activity prior to Bloody Sunday.
14 Were you conscious of an increase in incidents?
15 A. I was conscious of an increase in incidents throughout
16 Northern Ireland on the part of the IRA, and that is the
17 reason why I went to see the IRA because I was concerned
18 that our march would be used as an opportunity for any
19 type of confrontation.